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THE CASE FOR REGISTERING PATENTS AND THE  
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRESENT PATENT-OBTAINING RULES 
 
F. Scott Kieff * 
 
Abstract 
The legal rules for determining whether an inventor is entitled to a 
patent are presently enforced in the first instance by the Patent Office 
through ex parte examination of patent applications.  Critics of various 
aspects of the patent system suggest that these rules should be ratcheted 
up in some way, subjecting patents to more scrutiny during Patent Office 
examination.  Departing from existing literature, this paper offers a 
hypothetical model system under which patent applications are merely 
registered, not examined, to show how hard look approaches like 
examination increase social costs over soft look approaches like 
registration.  The paper presents a new normative view of present positive 
law rules for obtaining patents that sees these rules as primarily operating 
to minimize social cost, and accounts for otherwise puzzling aspects of the 
patent system.  This “registration” theory for the patent-obtaining rules is 
a companion to the “commercialization” theory for the patent-enforcing 
rules presented in prior work by the same author and these together are 
shown to offer a more coherent view of the patent system than other 
theories in the literature, such as the so-called “prospect” and “rent 
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dissipation” theories.  Far from defending the status quo of the present 
system, the registration theory identifies those rules that are essential and 
those that should be reformed.  The registration theory reveals inherent 
registration aspects of our present system; and elucidates reasons for 
eschewing reforms presented elsewhere in the literature and adopting 
those presented here.   
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Allowing an Internet shopper who is a regular customer of a web 
site to buy what she has selected on the site, without her having to click a 
confirmatory button indicating she really meant to buy it, may hardly seem 
like something that should have been found appropriate for patent 
protection by a well functioning patent office in 1997.1  Yet, the 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
1 But see U.S. Patent No. 5,9604,11 (issued Sept. 28, 1999), entitled “Method 
And System For Placing A Purchase Order Via a Communications Network,” listing Jeff 
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preliminary injunction a federal court issued to enforce such a patent 
against the web site operated by Barnesandnoble.com during the 1999 
Christmas season required shopping on the site to proceed only if done 
with two or more clicks, which was a potential annoyance to customers 
and cause of lost revenue for the company.2  Although the preliminary 
injunction was eventually vacated on appeal based on the questionable 
validity of the patent in view of the prior art,3 the defendant’s litigation 
costs to obtain this result could not have been minor.4   
The threat of cases like this and others has prompted the Federal 
Trade commission and the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division to ask 
in their announcement of joint hearings on such issues 
To what extent do questions about the scope and types of 
patents (e.g., business methods patents), and the procedures 
and criteria under which they are issued, raise competition 
issues? To what extent do substantive and procedural rules, 
                                                                                                                         
colloquially called “one-click shopping,” the application for which was filed on 
September 12, 1997.   
2 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc. 73 F.Supp.2d 1228 (W.D. Wa. 
1999) (granting motion for preliminary injunction on December 1), vacated and 
remanded by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).   
3 239 F.3d at 1366 (vacating and remanding because “substantial questions as to 
the validity of the ‘411 patent”).   
4 The published order of the trial court lists fourteen different attorneys on the 
side of the defendant.  73 F.Supp.2d 1228.  The case was filed on October 21, 1999, and 
the preliminary injunction was entered roughly seven weeks later, after expedited 
discovery including depositions, and five days of oral arguments.  Given the emergent 
need to handle so many tasks in such a case it fairly may be assumed that the listed 
attorneys were billing most, say two-thirds, of their time on the case while working most 
of the time, say 12 hour days six days a week.  At a blended rate of $250 per hour, this 
suggests the total legal fees through the entry of the preliminary injunction were over one 
million dollars ($1,176,000).  The fees through the appeal are likely to have been at least 
another one million dollars, based on similar calculations.  See, AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION 2001 REPORT OF ECONOMICS SURVEY, Tab 
22 (2001) (reporting total cost of litigation including discovery, motion practice, trial, and 
appeal to be $1.5-$2.9 million, depending upon whether the amount at stake in the 
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both at agency and judicial levels, have implications for 
initial and sequential innovation, competition, and 
appropriability?5 
The hearings that followed this announcement spanned most of 2001, 
during which many critics of the patent system argued that the system may 
be in steep decline due to an increase in the number of patents issued by 
the Patent Office that these critics suggest do not meet the proper 
patentability standards and as a result are too broad or too narrow, unduly 
tax and retard negotiations, or frustrate competition.6   
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
5 NOTICES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, 66 Fed. Reg. 58146, 58147 
(Nov. 20, 2001) (announcing joint hearings and explaining the reasons for them).  See 
also, FTC Press Release: Muris Announces Plans for Intellectual Property Hearings, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/11/iprelease.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2002) 
(including links to Federal Register Notice and to speech by Chairman Muris) (collecting 
sources and questioning these and other aspects of the patent system).   
6 For a schedule of the hearings including participants and topics see 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/detailsandparticipants.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2002).  
For a collection of academic and popular literature making these criticisms see Mark A. 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496, n.1 
(2001).   
Although many see only broad scope as a potential problem because the patent 
right to exclude may be seen as extending too far, others see a couple of problems 
associated with narrowness.  First, the work by Eisenberg and others points out how too 
many patents of too narrow scope can be seen to unduly tax and retard transactions.  See 
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Sci-ence, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 126-29 (1999) (suggesting that patents on 
multiple gene fragments, such as ESTs, could block the use of a larger DNA sequence of 
which they are a part, and citing Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) 
(arguing that patents can deter innovation in the field of basic biological research)).  This 
argument and its implications are explored in depth in the other important works by 
Eisenberg.  See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Property Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE. L. J. 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Norms of 
Science] (exploring potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the 
field of basic biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of 
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Experimental Use](exploring an experimental use exemption 
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While a ratcheting-up of the screening done in the first instance by 
the Patent Office, to achieve a more “hard look” examination, is both an 
intuitive and often urged response, this paper makes the counterintuitive 
suggestion that instead the Patent Office should do a “soft look” 
examination, if any examination at all.7  Because the question any 
evaluator must always ask is not whether any one system has negative 
aspects, but rather how it compares to alternatives, this paper focuses on 
such a comparative analysis.8   
To best understand the intuition behind soft look systems 
generally, this paper offers as a model a hypothetical alternative system 
under which patent applications are registered, not examined.9  Study of 
this model reveals both how the social costs associated with “hard-look” 
examination systems are especially large and how the costs associated 
with “soft-look” systems – such as the present system and the model 
registration system – are especially small.10   
                                                                                                                         
rights on scientific norms in the field of basic biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Public Research and Private Development: Patents & Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg, 
Public Research] (offering preliminary observations about the empirical record of the use 
of patents in the field of basic biological research and recommending a retreat from 
present government policies of promoting patents in that field).  Second, the work by 
Jacob and others point out how claims of narrow scope may be enforced in ways that 
avoid significant antitrust scrutiny.  Robin Jacob, Side Bar: Objectionable Narrowness of 
Claim, in DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG A. NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE 
NEWMAN, AND F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1097-1099 (2nd ed. 2001) 
(providing examples and collecting sources of early arguments supporting pro-
competitive aspects of narrow claims).   
7 The “hard-look” and “soft-look” terminology refers to the level of scrutiny 
given a patent upon filing.  While at least some patents should get a hard look at some 
point, this paper shows how the social costs associated with providing a hard look 
through civil litigation are expected to be less, especially when accompanied by the other 
important features of the patent system discussed infra in Part IV.   
8 See, Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. 
& ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (critiquing so-called nirvana approaches in favor of comparative 
institutional approaches). 
9 See infra Part III.   
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In focusing on social cost, the paper offers a new normative 
account of the positive law rules for obtaining patents.11  The registration 
theory offered in this paper shows how the essential patentability rules 
mitigate significant social costs and how existing normative views of the 
patent system fail to account for the social costs that are mitigated by these 
rules.12  Far from defending the present patent system, the paper offers a 
number of significant modifications that are expected to be successful in 
further mitigating social costs by embracing, somewhat counter-
intuitively, the admittedly expensive tools of commercial litigation.13   
In the final analysis, the prescriptive conclusions the paper reaches 
are somewhat modest.14  Although the conclusions of the paper are limited 
in part because they are based largely on empirical determinations and 
balancing that cannot be done responsibly without further data, the paper 
does provide a new and practicable framework for making such 
evaluations.15  In addition, although the conclusions of the paper may also 
be limited in part because we already may be operating under a soft look 
system de facto, at least in many respects, the paper does offer several 
reforms designed to bring the present system more in line with soft look 
systems like the proposed registration model.16  Furthermore, the 
conclusions drawn here also may be influenced by our broader views on 
the comparative strengths of different decision-making regimes, such as 
between those that are centralized and those that are individualized and 
dispersed, and between those based on rules and those based on 
                                                 
11 The paper thereby builds on earlier work by the present author that offers a 
normative account of the rules for enforcing patent.  See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property 
Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 
(2001).   
12 See infra Parts II-V.   
13 See infra Part V.   
14 See infra Parts V-VI.   
15 As discussed infra in Parts II-V, the registration theory’s ease of 
implementation is one of the theory’s important comparative benefits over other theories 
of the patent system, such as the “prospect” and “rent dissipation” theories.   
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standards.17  Regardless of the prescriptive value any of the paper’s 
conclusions may have for positive patent law directly, the paper’s 
elucidation for the first time of a normative account of the patent systems 
rules for obtaining patents as operating to minimize certain social costs 
will help commentators and policy makers evaluate other proposed 
reforms in the future.18   
The paper proceeds in the five remaining parts as follows: Part II 
reviews the existing normative theories of the patent system and shows 
how they fail to offer practicable approaches for a positive law regime and 
fail to minimize social costs.19  Part III explores the case for an alternative 
hypothetical model of a registration system and shows how social costs 
can be minimized by use of such a system.20  Part IV reviews the law and 
economics of the core patent obtaining rules and shows how the 
registration theory dominates other normative theories both in ability to be 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of the broader debate between legal systems based on rules 
and those based on standards, see generally, MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES, 15-64 (1987) (describing basic framework of the debate and collecting 
sources); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis And Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (reviewing more recent literature and collecting 
sources); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992) (exploring the costs implicated by the choice between rules and standards and 
showing: rules typically are more costly than standards to create; standards typically are 
more costly for individuals to interpret, both by individuals deciding how to act under 
them and by government decision-makers deciding how to apply them; and individuals 
are more likely to act in accordance with the goals of rules as long as the individuals can 
determine how they will be applied).  Also compare, Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining 
Under Rules Versus Standards 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995) (showing how parties 
may negotiate with each other under both types of regimes and arguing that in certain 
two-party cases bargaining may be more efficient under a standard than under a rule), 
with ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 100 (1988) (arguing 
that private bargaining over the allocation of the legal entitlement may be more efficient 
if the entitlement is clearly defined and assigned ex ante according to a rule, rather than 
made ex post by a judge applying a standard).   
18 As discussed infra Parts II-V, the registration theory’s explanatory power for 
the present patent system is another of the theory’s important comparative benefits over 
other theories of the patent system, such as the “prospect” and “rent dissipation” theories.  
19 See infra Part II.   
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implemented and in ability to account for the patent-obtaining rules in the 
present system.21  Part V compares the pure registration model to the 
present system we have operating today and offers some proposed reforms 
to the present system.22  Part VI concludes.23   
II. CONTEXT WITHIN THE PATENT LAW & ECONOMICS LITERATURE  
Prevailing normative views of the patent system fail to account for 
significant social costs that are mitigated by many of the present 
patentability rules.24    While the prevailing views do provide important 
lessons about how the patent system can mitigate certain social costs, they 
fail to show, in any practical way, how to mitigate others, or how to 
mitigate social cost overall.  More specifically, they fail to address 
important issues such as how to evaluate an invention, either to determine 
its entitlement to some patent or other reward, or to determine its relative 
entitlement when compared with other inventions.25  These issues turn out 
not to be small administrative matters.26  The normative view offered in 
this paper shows how the present patent system has evolved essential tools 
for making these determinations in ways that mitigate social cost.27   
The patent system in this country has generally been seen as 
offering inventors an incentive to do something they might not otherwise 
                                                 
21 See infra Part IV.  
22 See infra Part V.  
23 See infra Part VI.  
24 See infra Part IV, elucidating the law and economics of the core patent 
obtaining rules and showing how the registration theory dominates other normative 
theories both in ability to be implemented and in ability to account for the patent-
obtaining rules in the present system.   
25 See infra notes 48-51 and accompany text.   
26 See infra Part IV, showing how these issues are addressed by the present 
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do – for example, invent, disclose, commercialize, or design around.28  
These incentives are generated by the grant in each patent of the right to 
exclude others from doing whatever is covered by the patent’s claims.29 
Recognizing that discrete incentives like these, focused on inventors, 
could be provided directly, without the output restricting effects of the 
patent right to exclude, commentators have for over a century explored 
alternative ways to provide these incentives using tools such as cash 
rewards and tax credits.30   
In his 1977 piece on the so-called prospect theory of the patent 
system, which builds upon work by Barzel and others, Kitch showed how 
the granting of formal property rights, as opposed to cash rewards, is 
important for avoiding the social costs associated with racing towards a 
common prize.31  Called rent dissipation by Grady and Alexander in 
1992,32 the racing problem can be demonstrated by the example of 
community characterized by a prize having a known value and an 
                                                 
28 For a review of the literature and a collection of sources see CHISUM ET 
AL.supra note 6, at 58-90 (reviewing various incentive theories for the patent system).  
See also, Eisenberg, Experimental Use, supra note 6, at 1024-46 (same).   
29 Patents give only a right to exclude use of whatever product or process is 
covered by the patent’s claim or claims.  Thus, for example, patents do not interfere with 
other governmental efforts to restrict use, such as to mitigate environmental impact.  See 
F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 307, 308 (2002) 
(Invited symposium piece for National Association of Environmental Law Societies 
annual meeting entitled “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future,” held March 15-
17, 2002, at Washington University School of Law) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a) (1994) 
(“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the right to exclude 
others.”)). 
30 For a detailed review of the history and modern iterations of prize proposals, 
including a new improvement thereon, see, Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent 
Prizes, __ VAND. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2003).  (collecting sources and arguing for 
the establishment of an agency to distribute a fund that would be used to reward 
corporate efforts to reduce the monopoly effects of patent rights).    
31 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977) (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 348 (1968)). 
32 Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. 
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uncoordinated group of individuals who are each seeking the prize and 
who therefore each might rationally elect to spend up to just less than the 
value of the prize to get it, which would mean that as a group they are 
spending more in aggregate than the value of the prize.33   
While rent dissipation can be a problem in theory, recent work by 
Abramowicz adroitly points out a number of factors that may mitigate rent 
dissipation effects in practice.34  These include risk aversion by those 
racing, opportunity costs facing those racing, diversity among those 
racing, the importance to the group of the time it takes to get the reward, 
and externalities in the form of the costs or benefits imposed on others by 
those racing, such as the income to those who sell goods and services 
needed by those racing or the costs to those who are bothered by the 
activities associated with racing.35     
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
33 Consider a case in which the value of the prize is X and the group of 
individuals is Y in number.  Each individual might rationally elect to spend up to just less 
than X to obtain the prize, say some amount equal to X minus a small discount, say G, or 
(X-G).  Yet, if all individuals spend that amount, then the community has spent the 
amount equal to [(X-G) x Y] to obtain something worth only X.  The following 
mathematical representation will be true as long as X and Y are numbers greater than one 
and G is a number less than one:  
[(X-G) x Y] > Y 
This means that the amount society spent to obtain the prize is greater than the amount 
society got by obtaining the prize, which would be a waste or resources.  
34 MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, COPYRIGHT REDUNDANCY, GEORGE MASON 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES, 10-18 
(2003) (collecting sources and showing how each of these issues may operate to mitigate 
rent dissipation effects).   
35 Id. A more palpable, albeit mythological, example of these positive 
externalities of racing might include the joy children experience when they drink the 
Tang and use the Velcro that many think were brought to society through the NASA-
sponsored space race and the corresponding negative externalities might include the 
cavities some children got from increased exposure to this sugared drink and their 
difficulty tying knots after growing up with shoes kepts on by hook-and-loop fasteners 
ifnstead of laces.  See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case For Copyright Than For 
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What is more, rent seeking presumes there is a single prize, or at 
least a discrete number of prizes.36  But those seeking to solve a problem 
may not get to the same solution; they may get to different solutions and 
there may be even more solutions to be gotten.37  While an interesting 
question explored at some length in other recent work by Abramowicz38 is 
whether multiple solutions to a given problem can be wasteful when the 
good at issue is not really needed,39 when the utility of the good at issue is 
substantial, the benefits of multiple solutions may dominate.40  That is, 
                                                                                                                         
(Footnote Continued) 
The creation of “spin off” inventions has often been urged as one of the 
benefits of government-funded research.  See George J. Howick, The 
NASA Technology Utilization Program, in UTILIZING R & D BY-
PRODUCTS 69, 78-82 (Jerome W. Blood ed., 1967) (describing NASA 
program and examples of spin-off inventions, including inorganic 
paint, walking wheel chair, maintenance-free lubricated bearings, and 
sight-controlled switches). Some other examples of commercial 
products arising out of the space program include, smoke detectors, 
graphite, an artificial pancreas, heated ski goggles and hang gliders, but 
not velcro, teflon or tang. See Paul Hoversten, Space Technology Put to 
Earthly Use, USA TODAY, April 6, 1989, at 3A.   
36 Although it is often useful when modeling a problem to reduce it to a 
manageable form to construct the model, the single-solution element of the rent seeking 
models cannot be extrapolated to provide meaningful guidance for policy makers without 
at least consideration of whether in the real world the set of possible solutions to a given 
problem (prizes) is limited, and whether we are nearing such a limit.   
37 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.   
38 ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 34.   
39 Interestingly, the fair use defense and the utility exception to copyrightable 
subject matter may combine to make uses that are needed effectively beyond the 
enforceable reach of any valid copyright rights.   
40 An increase in the number of available solutions will increase the chance of 
each person gaining access to any one solution.  This is one reason why the patent system 
does not require the claimed invention to be “better” than the prior art, only new and 
nonobvious. As then-judge Warren Burger wrote, quoting Judge Rich:  
Progress is most effectively promoted by protecting those who enrich the 
art as well as those who improve it. Even though their inventions are not 
as good as what already exists, such inventors are not being rewarded for 
standing still or for retrogressing, but for having invented something. The 
system is not concerned with the individual inventor’s progress but only 
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while more may not always be better, it also may not always be worse.  
Consider the multiple, independently patentable and non-infringing 
solutions to the problem of pain and inflammation: aspirin, acetaminophen 
(Tylenol), ibuprofen (Advil, Motrin), selective COX-2 inhibitors 
(Vioxx and Celebrex), and various steroids.41  Some patients can only 
take some of these drugs, and some patients can take all, but not at all 
times.  In the real world we don’t know ex ante whether more solutions 
are going to be redundant, or whether they will both increase consumer 
choice and provide access to more consumers (those who could not 
consume the earlier solutions).42   
An additional problem with the prospect and rent dissipation 
theories is that they present themselves with the very problem they attempt 
to solve.  As McFetridge and Smith pointed out soon after Kitch, the more 
effective the patent is in coordinating activities of those in the industry 
after the patent has issued,43 the greater will be the problems of racing 
                                                                                                                         
Commissoner of Pats. v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber-Scheideanstalt, 397 F.2d 656, 667 
(D.C.Cir.1968) (Burger, J.) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, in JOHN F. 
WITHERSPOON NONOBVIOUSNESS – THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 2:1 
(1979), reprinted from 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960) (admonishing that we must 
avoid “the unsound notion that to be patentable an invention must be better than the prior 
art.”)).   
41 It is not always the case that an independently patentable invention will avoid 
infringement of earlier patents.  Patentability of the second invention turns on a very 
different set of questions than its possible infringement of the first patent.  The 
patentability analysis of the second invention will turn largely on the scope of 
information in the art at the time that invention is sought to be patented, which includes 
the disclosure in the first patent.  For more on the rules of patentability over the prior art 
see CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6 at 323-706 (treatise and casebook teaching and collecting 
sources).  The possible analysis of infringement of the first patent by the second 
invention on the will turn on the claims of the first patent.  For more on the rules of patent 
infringement see CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6 at 829-1041 (treatise and casebook teaching 
and collecting sources).   
42 In areas where we can make good judgments ex ante about which avenues of 
research are most likely to be productive it may be possible to fund the work 
prospectively.  The government grant making processes such as those at NIH and NSF 
basically operate this way by empanelling experts in the field to review grant 
applications.    
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towards the patent application before filing.44  Kitch’s response was to 
argue that the coordination costs are likely to be low in such early stages 
because there are likely to be only a small number of players at this 
stage.45  But this response does not fully answer the problem.  As 
Abramowicz correctly points out, the transaction costs may be high in 
such a community because the members may have significant cognitive 
biases.46  The transaction costs to coordinating may also be high if the 
racers do not even know about each other.47   
But the central limitation of the prospect theory is that it does not 
offer a way to use the social cost lessons of prospecting to design legal 
rules for obtaining patents that can operate to ex ante to mitigate social 
costs of prospecting.  Instead Kitch argues that the prospect theory 
explains why the commercial success associated with a patented invention 
should be an important factor in determining whether it is patentable.48   
Similarly, the rent-dissipation theory urges a finely tuned patent 
system that will grant and enforce patents only when the balance of these 
                                                 
44 Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and 
Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197 (1980). 
45 Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 
J.L. & ECON. 205 (1980). 
46 Abramowicz, supra note 30 at 57 (collecting sources on cognitive biases of 
overconfidence and overoptimism).   
47 They may not know each other because the field may be so new that the 
community of people working in it is not defined.  Or, the potential members of the 
community may generally be known but without the freedom to divulge their work to 
each other that is given by a patent they may not know enough about each other to 
coordinate.  This latter type of coordination problem is known generally as the Arrow 
Information Paradox.  See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention, RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962).   
48 Kitch supra note 31, at 283 (discussing commercial success).  Later, in the 
same work, Kitch may be advocating that the test for patentability over the prior art 
should merely be novelty, without nonobviousness.  Id. at 284 (“Thus substantial novelty 
is an economically rational test of patentability.”).  Such an argument would accord with 
the social cost saving benefits of the registration theory outlined here. See infra Part 
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pre patent and post patent racing costs tips just the right way.49  But the 
rent dissipation theory does not provide a framework for making such 
determinations ex ante, at the time a private party would decide whether to 
file a patent application or at the time the Patent Office would examine it, 
and instead only identifies a select few reported judicial decisions that 
according to the summary accounts of Grady and Alexander turn out to be 
ex post examples of results that may have avoided rent dissipation.50   
In the final analysis, at least to date, the prospect and rent 
dissipation theories provide important insights about how the patent 
system can have the effect of both increasing and decreasing rent 
dissipation-type social costs.  But the theories do not offer a tool for 
comparing these costs against other social costs, assessing net social costs, 
or for doing all of this in a way that would work for making patentability 
determinations in a timely fashion.51   
The importance of being able to make determinations about 
patentability and patent scope around the time of the application recently 
has been emphasized in a number of areas of the literature.  Wagner, in his 
work on the patent infringement doctrine called the “doctrine of 
equivalents,” elucidates the importance of information forcing default 
penalty rules as inducement to potential patentees to produce socially 
                                                 
49 See Grady and Alexander supra note 32 (offering a complicated method for 
making patentability determinations using a host of factors many of which are determined 
long after a patent application is filed, such as the importance of the patent in controlling 
down-stream rent dissipating effects).  
50 Id., at 343-347 (discussing only a few cases in summary).  Furthermore, one 
of the few cases Grady and Alexander rely upon as illustrative of the rent dissipation 
theory, General Mills v. Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.1967), does not accord with 
any of the prevailing trends in the case law over time.  An electronic search using the 
Westlaw KeyCite service did not reveal a single case after 1972 that cited Pillsbury  
and further revealed that if anything the case is mis-cited by a commentator as 
announcing a per se rule against patents in the field of culinary arts.  See, Malla Pollack, 
Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or How to Copyright a Cake: a 
Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477, 1523 (1991) (“Food items are patentable, 
but the culinary creativity of chefs is not the type of creativity which meets the standards 
for patentability.”).   
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valuable information early in the life of the patent.52 In addition, Long, in 
her work on the often over-looked signaling function of patents, shows 
how in certain circumstances the information signaling function of patents 
may even be more valuable to the rights holder than the substantive rights 
conferred by patent law.53   
Similarly, my own earlier work on the commercialization theory of 
patents shows how the patent right to exclude operates, as designed, at the 
time after inventions are made to help bring such nascent inventions to 
market through the process called commercialization.54 According to this 
view, patents allow patentees, and the many others with whom they must 
negotiate to achieve commercialization, by allowing them to internalize 
the full benefits of the subject matter claimed, in keeping with the work by 
Demsetz on the emergence of property rights generally.55  Also according 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
52 R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and The 
Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159 (2002) (arguing for a shift in focus from the 
allocation of liability during infringement (ex post) towards rules that generate incentives 
both during and before inventors apply for patents (ex ante) so as to better understand 
information-forcing default penalty rules like the limitation on the doctrine of equivalents 
known as the “doctrine of prosecution history estoppel,” which holds out the possibility 
of lost patent scope as an inducement to potential patentees to produce socially valuable 
information early in the life of the patent.).   
53 Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002)(exploring the 
signaling function of patents generally, including the potential role of the patent 
document itself to convey information that would not be as credible when revealed in 
other contexts.).   
54 Kieff supra note 11, at 707-10 (explaining how the right to exclude use 
promotes commercialization by facilitating the social ordering and bargaining around 
inventions that are necessary to generate output in the form of information about the 
invention, a product of the invention, or a useful embodiment of the invention).     
55 Id., at 717-718, 727-41 (discussing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967), and Harold Demsetz, The Private 
Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & Econ. 293 (1970)).  The commercialization theory 
may resemble some aspects of the prospect theory.  See Id., at 707, n. 47 (“The incentive 
to commercialize theory discussed herein is similar in some respects to the ‘prospect’ 
theory elucidated by Kitch, which views the patent as important in providing incentives 
for investment in increasing the value of a patented technology.”) (citing Kitch, supra 
note 31).  But Kitch focused on Barzel’s work and on coordination as a tool to decrease 
pre-patent and post-patent rent seeking, or what can be viewed as over-use of certain 
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to this view, determinations about the property right must be made early in 
the commercialization process in order for that process to occur.56  Indeed, 
as pointed out in this earlier work, the desire to help the commercialization 
of inventions was a central motivating factor behind the present patent 
system, which remains largely based on the 1952 Patent Act.57   
To be sure, the commercialization view of the patent system, as 
elucidated thus far, may not be without its problems.  First, as Abamowicz 
exhaustively explores in at least two of his present projects, there may be 
ways to modify the patent right to exclude so that commercialization is 
still achieved while at the same time minimizing potential output 
                                                                                                                         
contradistinction, commercialization focuses on Demsetz’s work and on coordination as a 
tool to prevent the under-use of certain resources.  Kieff supra note 11 at 717-718, 727-
41 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz).  Although the earlier literature does suggest 
some correlation between these works of Kitch and Demsetz, it merely collects them 
together, without elucidating their interrelationships and differences.  See, e.g., 
Eisenberg, Experimental Use, supra note 6, at 1040 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz 
and noting: “The prospect theory offers a justification for patents that is in keeping with 
broader theories of property rights elaborated by Harold Demsetz.”); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 309, n. 108 
(1996) (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz and noting: “For neoclassicists, therefore, 
intellectual property is less about creating an artificial scarcity in intellectual creations 
than about managing the real scarcity in the other resources that may be employed in 
using, developing, and marketing intellectual creations.”); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in 
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 
462 (1998) (citing work by Demsetz and noting: “Similar reasoning underlies Edmund 
Kitch’s proposed ‘prospect’ approach to patents.”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 
121, n. 236 (1999) (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz but seeing the under use problem 
as “not readily apparent in the context of intellectual property”). 
56 This is because the property right is not serving a reward function or a simple 
cost-subsidization function but rather is serving a coordination function.  Kieff supra note 
11, at 712 (“Thus, as compared with a reward system, the patent system may be not only 
better able to improve coordination among market players engaged in the invention 
commercialization process, it also may be better able to avoid rent dissipation.”) (citing 
Grady and Alexander supra note 32).   
57 Id. at 736-46 (showing how the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act were 
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restricting effects of the strong right to exclude.58  Second, as Abamowicz 
also points out, the commercialization view may be both over-inclusive 
and under-inclusive.59  Stated differently, the commercialization view as 
discussed thus far does not fully explain, for example, why the patent 
system does not afford protection to help commercialize technologies that 
do not meet the tests for patentability, such as novelty, but nevertheless are 
presently not being commercialized.60   
The commercialization view does offer at least an implicit answer 
to this problem when it points out the screening role played by competitors 
of the patentee with the help of a court, which would have to be played by 
government decision-makers under a reward system.61  Under the 
commercialization view, the competitors of the patentee are provided with 
incentives to bring information about a patent’s validity to the attention of 
                                                 
58 Abramowicz offers some important add-on tools for the patent system that 
would take the core rules for obtaining and enforcing patents as given but at some point 
during the patent term buy out the patent right through a carefully crafted system to 
ensure the right price is paid.  See, Abramowicz supra, note 30.  See also Michael 
Abramowicz, The Human Genome Project in Retrospect, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT ___ (2003) 
(forthcoming).   
59 See, Abramowicz supra, note 30, at 49-50.  I also thank participants in the 
Spring 2001 Workshop Series of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at the 
University of Chicago Law School for raising a similar objection.  My response to both 
begins with a reminder of the brief discussion of the screening function in the paper on 
which they were commenting, see Kieff, supra note 11, at 712-17, and continues with the 
registration theory presented in this paper.   
60 These might be technologies that have been forgotten, that never managed to 
draw sufficient coordinated interest to have been commercialized, or have been only 
commercialized outside of this country.  Indeed, although so-called “patents of 
importation” were available for inventions not previously commercialized in the realm in 
England and in the colonies before the country was established, they essentially have not 
been allowed in this country since its inception.  See Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty in 
Historical Perspective, (pts. 1-2) 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 689, 777 (1993) 
(discussing history of the novelty provision in the US patent system at the time of 
framing).  The law and economics of the novelty provisions in the present patent system, 
including the treatment of foreign activity as prior art are discussed infra Part IV.A.1.   
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a decision maker.62  Accordingly, the Barnesandnoble.com case discussed 
at the beginning of this paper63 represents one example of the screening 
function contemplated by the commercialization view, albeit at a cost that 
is not insignificant.64   
Although this admittedly significant cost of screening patents 
through civil litigation presents a serious obstacle to any theory that 
embraces a soft look approach, especially registration, these costs must be 
compared against the costs of allocating or screening patents using other 
approaches.65  As shown more fully by exploring the hypothetical model 
registration system below, the registration theory offers comparative 
practicable and inexpensive tools for screening patents.66   
                                                 
62 Id.  It also appears that Kitch may also have noticed this feature of the patent 
system in his reply to McFetridge and Smith: 
A patent system is a grant system with the clever feature that it 
generates private incentives for those with comparative advantage in 
the innovating activity to reveal the information necessary to define the 
prospect right.  Without this incentive, the granting agency would have 
to determine the appropriate scope and technical area of the prospect 
rights with access only to its own information.   
Kitch supra note 45, at 207, n5.  What is not clear from this text is whether “private 
parties” refers to patentees, the patentees’ competitors, or both.  As explained in more 
detail infra in Part IV, each of these players in the patent system plays a crucial role in 
making sure the patent claim scope is “just right” in a way that minimizes social costs.   
63 See supra notes 1-4, and accompany text.   
64 See supra note 4 (showing representative costs).   
65 See supra note 8 (discussing importance of comparative analysis).  The 
advantages of screening under a soft look approach, which were identified by the 
commercialization theory, bring into question the role of the Patent Office in a way that 
provides the impetus for the registration theory explored here.  See supra notes 60-64 
(citing Kieff supra note 11, at 712-717).  Thus, the registration theory can be seen as a 
companion to, or application of, the broader commercialization theory, which motivated 
the framing of the present patent system.  See supra note 54 (summarizing 
commercialization theory).   
66 See infra Part III for discussion of the registration model itself; and infra Part 
IV-V for application of the model to our present patent system, including proposed 
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III. THE REGISTRATION MODEL 
Many patent critics would begin their reform efforts by ratcheting 
up the level of scrutiny given to patent applications during Patent Office 
examination to avoid the social costs due to patents that ultimately may be 
adjudicated invalid through federal court litigation.67  The registration 
model explored more fully below shows that the level of scrutiny given to 
patent applications before the Patent Office should be ratcheted down, 
because the cost of thorough examination would be higher than the costs 
of federal court litigation.68   
The hypothetical model patent system differs from our present one 
in that patent applications would be merely registered in the Patent Office 
rather than examined.69  Under the present system, patent applications are 
filed in the Patent Office and examined for compliance with the legal rules 
for patentability by technically and legally trained staff of that 
administrative agency.70  Under the examination process, also called 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
67 For sources, see supra note 5 and Lemley supra note 6.   
68 See infra notes 76-85, and accompany text (discussing costs of providing and 
evaluating the information needed to determine validity over the prior art).   
69 This involves a shift to soft look approach that is counter to the suggested 
shifts in the literature.  For sources arguing for harder look, see supra note 5 and Lemley 
supra note 6.   
70 The extent to which the Patent Office is like other administrative agencies, 
and therefore subject to the body of administrative law, has been a topic of substantial 
debate over the past several years in the literature and in the case law.  Compare, e.g., 
Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415 
(1995) (arguing that administrative law doctrines such as “Chevron deference” should be 
applied to Patent Office decisions) with Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the 
Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2000) (arguing that administrative 
law doctrines should not apply to patent law).  Also compare Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 
U.S. 150 (1999) (holding that contrary to almost a century of practice the Administrative 
Procedures Act’s standard of review provisions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706 do apply to 
factual determinations of the Patent Office) with Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 
1549-50 (Fed.Cir., 1996), in which the Federal Circuit stated  the following: 
As we have previously held, the broadest of the [Patent 
Office]’s rulemaking powers – 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) – authorizes the 
Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to “the conduct 
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patent prosecution, the ex-parte exchange between applicant and Patent 
Office Examiner typically lasts about three years before an application that 
has not been either finally rejected or abandoned issues as a patent.71  
Having been examined, issued patents enjoy a procedural and substantive 
presumption of validity; and a party challenging a patent must prove 
invalidity under the heightened standard for civil litigation of “clear and 
convincing evidence.”72   
In the proposed registration model, patent applications would be 
filed with the Patent Office but not examined.  The Patent Office would 
maintain original files and make authentic copies available publicly, 
perhaps via the web for free, as is done with the EDGAR system for 
securities filings at the Securities and Exchange Commission.73  In 
addition, the presumption of validity would be eliminated, or at least 
                                                                                                                         
Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules. Because 
Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general 
substantive rulemaking power, the “Final Determination” at issue in 
this case cannot possibly have the “force and effect of law.” Thus, the 
rule of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply.   
(Footnotes and internal citations omitted) (holding that the Patent Office is not entitled to 
deference due to other administrative agencies, which are vested with sufficient power by 
Congress, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).   
71 See, e.g., CHISUM ET AL. supra, note 6, at 91-128 (describing examination 
procedures under present system).   
72 35 U.S.C. § 282 (presumption of validity).   
73 See SEC Filings & Forms (EDGAR), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Dec. 10, 2002).  As described on the front 
SEC web page about EDGAR:   
The SEC requires all public companies (except foreign 
companies and companies with less than $10 million in assets and 500 
shareholders) to file registration statements, periodic reports, and other 
forms electronically through EDGAR.  Anyone can access and 
download this information for free.  Here you’ll find links to a 
complete list of filings available through EDGAR and instructions for 
searching the EDGAR database.   
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relaxed, thereby allowing invalidity to be judged under the standard 
ordinarily used in civil litigation of “a preponderance of the evidence.”74   
Recent work by Lemley sheds some light on the strengths of soft-
look systems – such as the present system and the proposed registration 
model – as compared with hard-look systems in which patents are 
examined under stricter scrutiny.75  Lemley shows that “[b]ecause so few 
patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper for 
society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to 
invest additional re-sources examining patents that will never be heard 
from again.”76   
Lemley explores one important reason why the making of detailed 
validity determinations in litigation instead of in the Patent Office leads to 
lower net costs across all patents when he offers the core insight that 
litigation and its threat operate to provide important information about 
society’s level of interest in a given patent – only those patents that matter 
receive a hard look.77  But this information could be provided through 
other means, even perhaps directly to the Patent Office, which leaves open 
the issue of which method of providing this information is cheapest.78   
                                                 
74 Compare supra note 72 (citing higher presumption of validity under current 
system).   
75 See Lemley supra note 6.   
76 Lemley, supra, note 6, at 1497.  Merges also makes this argument in Robert P. 
Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights For 
Business Concepts And Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 595 (1999).   
77 Lemley, supra, note 6, at 1497 (The essential insight of this Essay stems from 
the little-acknowledged fact that the overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated 
or even licensed).   
78 The screening function identified by the commercialization theory suggests 
the registration approach offered here.  See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text 
(discussing genesis of registration theory).  For a discussion of strategies for bringing this 
information to the Patent Office, instead of to courts, see the discussion of systems that 
employ strategies that are soft-look/hard-look hybrids through various post-issuance 
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A more complete exploration of this open issue is therefore 
required to understand the many reasons why the costs of providing such 
information through litigation are less.79  One advantage of litigation is 
that because it comes later in time it allows more information about 
society’s interest in the patent to accrue, thereby decreasing the likelihood 
of error associated with ex ante efforts to predict which patents should 
receive close attention.80  Another advantage is that ex-post selection of 
those patents that turn out to matter raises fewer public choice problems 
than would ex ante efforts because the attention of both proponents and 
opponents of a given patent are more likely to both be at peak in later 
litigation.81  Decision-making through litigation mitigates many of the 
well-known problems associated with making award-type decisions.82   
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
79 This is the focus of the reiteration theory, as discussed throughout this paper.  
For a discussion of the law and economics of the patent-obtaining rules of the present 
system and why they make sense under the registration theory because they are cheap to 
enforce see infra Part IV.  For a discussion of potential improvements that may further 
decrease social costs see infra Part V.   
80 This is essentially the Lemley insight.  See Lemley, supra, note 6, at 1497.   
81 A central problem explored in the public choice literature is ensuring the 
proper timing of decision making so that those most interested will be able to have their 
views counted.  To be sure, this analysis must be seen against the background of the 
extensive literature on public choice theory.  See, e.g., DENNIS MUELLER, PERSPECTIVES 
ON PUBLIC CHOICE (1997) (collecting views and sources); DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE II (1997) (same); MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 
(1997) (same); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the 
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 
(1988) (same); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the 
Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 
199 (1988) (same); Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 
74 VA. L. REV. 191 (1988) (same).   
A related concern from the law and economic literature on patents is the 
importance of being able to know ex ante or at least early in the life of a patent the 
whether the patent will be valid.  See supra notes 52-54, and accompany text (discussing 
the importance of ex ante approaches).  But compare supra note 58 (discussing the 
importance of ex post approaches in Abramowicz’s work on retrospective spending).   
82 See, Kieff, supra note 11, at 714, n. 77 and accompany text (citing LEO KATZ, 
ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 200 
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This paper makes a radical departure from prior work in the field 
by showing how, on an individual-patent basis, the costs of providing the 
information needed to decide validity and the costs of “correct” 
adjudication with that information are likely to be lower if done in 
litigation than if done in a patent office.83  The intuition for this view is 
because the information relating to validity in litigated cases is rarely in 
the hands of the government but rather is often obtainable by, or in the 
hands of, a private party who experiences a strong incentive to bring that 
information to the attention of a court.84  As discussed more fully below, 
                                                                                                                         
(Footnote Continued) 
kind of kudos in comparison to those with allocating patents and showing why systems of 
cash rewards or tax credits would be poor substitutes for a patent system).   
83 While the Lemley insight looks to the aggregate cost across all patents, and 
points out that most patents turn out not to matter.  See Lemley, supra, note 6, at 1497.  
The insight provided in this paper looks at the cost for each patent that turns out to 
matter.  For a discussion of the law and economics of the patent-obtaining rules when 
applied to any one patent see infra Part IV.  These two insights may be combined to 
reveal the benefits of many of the proposed reforms discussed infra Parts V.C- V.E.   
84 Id. at 712-714 (discussing the role of a patentee’s competitors in policing the 
patent system by searching out and bringing to bear the best information regarding a 
patent’s validity).  
A somewhat similar tool for bringing to bear this information is the bounty 
system proposed in John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent 
System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 UNIV. ILLINOIS L. REV. 305. (2001).  But 
such bounty systems may not be net improvements.  They may provide some help in 
cases where the validity-destroying information is in the hands of someone other than the 
party seeking to invalidate the patent.  But they may not be needed and raise further 
problems.  To the extent the person having the information is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts, then that person is subject to the courts’ subpoena power and can be 
compelled to produce documents, testimony, or other evidence once uncovered by the 
party seeking to invalidate the patent.  The creation of a side market for these people to 
“sell” their information will frustrate the operation of the present systems that courts have 
developed for obtaining such information through third-party discovery.  To the extent 
third-party witness compensation practices are considered so stingy that they provide a 
disincentive to these people, they can be made more flush through modest amendment to 
the rules of procedure in such cases.   
An alternative approach is the effort to create higher incentives for the patent 
applicant to bring this information to bear during the patent examination process in the 
first instance as suggested in Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent 
System, 17 Berkeley T. L. J., 763, 767, n.12 (2002) (building upon and citing the fee 
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this information is more cheaply obtained, provided, and evaluated by 
private parties, including the patentee and competitors of the patentee, 
than by the government.85   
IV. THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF PATENT-OBTAINING RULES 
The benefits of soft-look patent systems, like either the present 
system or the proposed registration model, can be seen through the below 
law and economic analysis of present patent-obtaining rules.  Each major 
statutory requirement for patentability is studied, and its social cost-
                                                                                                                         
the text accompany notes 261-262, and see F. Scott Kieff, Comments Regarding 
Competition & Intellectual Property, Summary of Proposed Testimony,  at 12-13, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/harvardlaw.pdf 
(2001) (last visited Dec. 10, 2002), but arguing that they should be used to provide an 
incentive for the patent applicant to better inform the patent examination process, which 
differs from the argument presented here in that it adheres to the orthodoxy of advocating 
methods for improving “hard look” examination systems and eschews “soft look” 
approaches like those explored in this work); see also Shubha Ghosh  & Jay Kesan, What 
Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in The Patent Office, (2002) 
(manuscript on file with author) (arguing that Patent Office examination of patent 
applications, especially better informed examination, is important in making issued 
patents more valuable as the objects of licensing deals).  But, as discussed infra Part 
IV.A, the rules relating to patent validity are, and should be, responsive to information 
that happens to be not known or easily knowable by the patent applicant.  As a result, 
heaping added incentives to find this information on the back of the patent applicant is 
not likely to be an efficient tool for bringing this information to the attention of decision 
makers.   
Yet another approach is to alter the framework for appellate review of patent 
cases, as explored in the recent important work by Rai.  ARTI K. RAI, FACT, LAW, AND 
POLICY: AN ALLOCATION-OF-POWERS APPROACH TO PATENT SYSTEM REFORM, 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 02-20 (2003) (advocating change in the appellate review process).   
85 See infra part IV.A (reviewing patent-obtaining rules relating to the prior art, 
which turn out to be triggered by information that is in the hands of the specific parties 
the rules are designed to protect, not in the hands of the government). Merges makes a 
somewhat related point about the advantages private parties have over courts in 
evaluating information in patent cases in Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, 
and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (discussing private 
parties informational advantage in negotiating over an intellectual property right, which 
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minimizing qualities elucidated.86  Seen through this lens, otherwise 
puzzling aspects of the patent system appear for the first time to fit within 
a coherent normative framework, under which the positive law rules for 
obtaining patents operate primarily to minimize social cost.87   
Not only does the registration theory depart from existing literature 
by accounting for the patent-obtaining rules, it also focuses on the 
verifiable claims of both a patent applicant and the applicant’s 
competitors, instead of primarily on those of the applicant.88  That is, 
rather than first asking what scope of protection a patent applicant 
“deserves,”89 the registration theory begins with the presumption that the 
patentee is entitled to the largest scope of protection that does not actually 
infringe that freedom from patent protection some competitor of the 
patentee can claim legitimately to “deserve,” and provides a framework 
for judging this type of desert.90  In putting the burden on the competitor 
to justify freedom from the patent, this approach potentially leaves a 
                                                 
86 The rules are shown to practicably protect investment-backed expectations 
and facilitate ordering around protected territories.  See infra Parts IV.A-IV.A.3.   
87 The registration theory has explanatory power for the intricacies of these 
rules, which are not well explained by other law and economic theories of the patent 
system, like the prospect and rent-dissipation theories.  Those theories merely point out 
rent seeking concerns that are implicated by patents and at best suggest that ex ante 
determinations be made about which patents turn out to be better at decreasing the rent-
seeking type of social cost.  See supra notes 31-51.   
88 In contradistinction, the claims of the patentee are the focus of so-called 
“reward” theories discussed infra notes 105-108.   
89 Other law and economics theorists have tried to align the benefit a patent 
confers on the patentee on the one hand with the benefit an invention confers on society 
on the other hand.  See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS 
VERSUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 
WORKING PAPER NO. 6956 (1999) (discussing ways to improve the match between social 
surplus of the invention and the amount an inventor will recoup); MICHAEL KREMER, 
PATENT BUY-OUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION, NATIONAL 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 6304 (1997) (same).   
90 The registration theory focuses on those claims that are verifiable, which turns 
out to also have strong explanatory power for the intricacies of the patent-obtaining rules 
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patentee with what might be viewed as overly broad protection.91  But the 
theory also saddles the patentee with a strong incentive not to seek “too 
broad” protection and instead to get the scope “just right.”92   
A. THE PRIOR ART RULES INEXPENSIVELY PROTECT INVESTMENT 
Patent law’s rules regarding the prior art – the Section 10293 and 
Section 10394 requirements that a patentable invention be novel and 
nonobvious – protect investment-backed expectations of both the patentee 
and its competitors, and they do so in ways that involve remarkably few 
administrative costs.95  As discussed more fully below, the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements protect the investment-backed expectations 
of those other than the patentee by ensuring that a patent right to exclude 
will not extend to anything those in the art are doing or are about to do.96  
As also discussed more fully below, the one-year grace period of the 
                                                 
91 See supra note 6 (providing sources of criticism).   
92 The problem of getting patent scope “just right” has long dominated the 
literature.  See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 31 (offering prospect theory to show how broad 
scope controls rent dissipation in downstream research efforts); Grady and Alexander, 
supra note 32 (offering rent dissipation theory to show how scope can be adjusted to 
control rent dissipation in both upstream and downstream research efforts); Eisenberg, 
Experimental Use, supra note 6 (arguing for limited scope to protect competition rather 
than facilitate coordination; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (exploring economic impacts of 
scope); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The 
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) (same); Robert P. Merges & 
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 
(1990) (same).  For a discussion of the patentee’s incentives to get scope “just right” see 
infra Part IV.C.   
93 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty and statutory bars).  See also infra Part IV.A.1.   
94 35 U.S.C. § 103 (nonobviousness).  See also infra Part IV.A.2.   
95 See infra Parts IV.A.1-IV.A.2 (discussing how these rules account for 
verifiable investments).   
96 For a discussion of how the rules on novelty and nonobviousness protect these 
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statutory bar protects the investment-backed expectations of the 
patentee.97   
As Nozick recognized in his watershed libertarian work on the 
minimalist state, it is because of patent law’s prior art rules that the patent 
system does not run afoul of the Lockean proviso that property rights 
should leave enough in society’s commons for those other than the 
property holder.98  Patent law achieves this effect by making sure that 
valid patents leave others free to do whatever they otherwise were doing.99   
The registration theory goes further than the Libertarian realization 
that patent law can have this minimal effect on the freedom of those other 
than the patentee by suggesting that this effect should not be merely a 
consequence of the patent system, but a goal.100  The registration theory 
also adds the goal of achieving this effect with the lowest administrative 
                                                 
97 For a discussion of the grace period see infra notes 132-139 and 
accompanying text.   
98 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA 182 (1974) (noting that a 
patent does not deprive others of an object that would exist if not for the inventor). See 
also John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT (Prometheus Books 1986) Chapter V, ¶ 26 (property rights are only 
justified “where there is enough, and as good left in the common for others”).  The 
philosophy of intellectual property is broad topic with its own literature having recent 
representative works such as Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual 
Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841 (1993) 
(exploring potential liberty restraints associated with intellectual property rights); Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (exploring the 
case for property rights in intellectual property using the Lockean labor approach); and 
Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (exploring the case for 
the public’s property interest in being free from intellectual property rights).   
99 NOZICK, supra note 98.   
100 This goal is different from the goals of preventing rent seeking or giving a 
reward, which are the goals of the prospect, rent-dissipation, and reward theories offered 
by others.  Compare supra notes 31-51 (discussing prospect and rent-dissipation theories) 
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cost possible.101  Once these two relatively modest goals are envisioned, 
substantial light is shed on the justification and operation of the many 
otherwise complex positive law rules patent law has evolved for 
determining what counts as being in the prior art and what preclusive 
effects it will have on a patent claim.102  Other patent theories fail to 
provide any explanation for core patent-obtaining rules about the prior art, 
fail to offer their own workable rules, or yield perverse results.103   
Many patent theories try to answer the skeptical question raised 
about patents by one of the country’s first luminaries to write about 
patents, Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary of State oversaw the 
administration of the country’s first patent system.104 Jefferson felt it 
important to ask whether each invention was in the first instance “worth to 
the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”105  But any such 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
101 The prospect, rent-dissipation, and reward theories fail to offer any easy way 
to implement their goals.  Compare supra notes 31-51 (discussing prospect and rent-
dissipation theories) with infra notes 105-108 (discussing reward theories).   
102 See infra Parts IV.A.1-IV.A.4 (discussing operation of these rules).   
103 See supra notes 48-51 (prospect and rent dissipation theories do not offer 
workable rules); infra notes 82, 106-108 (reward theories do not offer workable rules 
either).   
104 President George Washington signed the Patent Act of 1790 into law on 
April 10, 1790.  Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.  See, KENNETH W. DOBYNS, 
THE PATENT OFFICE PONY – A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT OFFICE 22 (1994) 
(reviewing history of the Patent Office and collecting sources).   
105 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted 
in JEFFERSON WRITINGS 1291-92 (M. Peterson ed., 1894).  Interestingly, Jefferson’s 
views on patent issues may have been taken substantially out of context by many, 
including the Supreme Court:   
[T]here is nothing whatever to indicate that the views held by Jefferson 
were those of the Framers themselves or those of either the first federal 
Congresses or the early federal judiciary, or, for that matter, the general 
populace. In this regard, the Graham Court completely ignored the 
rejection by the second federal Congress of Jefferson’s proposal that a 
good defense to infringement should be that the invention “is so 
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theory that tries to tie the legitimacy of a patent to the nature of the 
invention faces a number of remarkably difficult problems.106  Theories 
tied to the merit of the invention face the conceptual problems of requiring 
some preliminary determination of how to judge merit in any practicable 
fashion.107  They also turn out to have faced serious practical problems 
concerning their application, as courts applying these approaches tended to 
avoid finding that any invention met the standard.108 
                                                                                                                         
(Footnote Continued) 
Edward C. Walterscheid, “Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant:” Constitutional 
Limitations on the Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 325 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted) (collecting sources) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) 
(consolidated with Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook 
Chem. Co.) and companion to United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)). 
106 Theories like this are generally referred to as “incentive to invent” or 
“reward” theories.  See generally, supra notes 28, 82 (collecting sources that review these 
theories and their pitfalls).   
107 The conceptual problems generally involve a mismatch between any 
particular metric of merit and our impressionistic view of the “right” result.  For example, 
if the metric were hard work then accidental inventions would not be patentable.  If the 
metric were value of the invention to society then determinations cannot be made ex ante. 
The many conceptual problems associated with measuring rewards are discussed in the 
sources cited supra note 82.   
108 By the late 1940’s courts would only allow a patent on an invention that they 
determined met the self-referential standard of “invention,” a test that had become so 
overly robust that Justice Jackson criticized it’s application in a 1949 dissent: “the only 
patent that is valid is one which this court has not been able to get its hands on.” 
Jurgensen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  See 
also Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent – or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952, 
(reprinted in WITHERSPOON supra note 40, at 1:1, 1:3 (1979) (discussing history of the 
nonobviousness requirement, and its use as a replacement for the requirement of 
invention); George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the 
Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437 (1999) (same).  Even 
after the requirement for “invention” was statutorily replaced by the 1952 Patent Act’s 
requirement for nonobviousness in Section 103, some courts continued to apply a 
standard remarkably similar to the one criticized by Justice Jackson.  Gerald J. 
Mossinghoff, Side Bar: The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in CHISUM ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 30-31 (former Patent Office Commissioner Mossinghoff explaining importance 
of creating the Federal Circuit in 1982 to bring uniformity to the application of patent law 
and avoid the results in some Circuits, as discussed during the confirmation hearings for 
then-Second Circuit Judge Thurgood Marshall’s nomination to the Supreme Court when 
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Some other patent theories suggest the patent-obtaining rules 
should be adjusted to be sensitive to complex economic factors, like 
coordination and rent dissipation.109  But some of these, like the prospect 
theory, fail to offer concrete rules usable ex ante to make determinations 
of patentability and instead just offer general guidelines, such as that 
patent claims can be better if broader.110  Others, like the rent dissipation 
theory, offer the perverse recommendation that an invention that is so far 
beyond the prior art that it is optimal should not be patentable under the 
prior art rules because a patent on it would both cause too much rent 
dissipation among those seeking the patent and not be needed to prevent 
rent dissipation among those who otherwise would race to improve upon 
it.111   
In contradistinction, the registration theory views the prior art rules 
as designed to achieve the more modest goals of protecting investment-
backed expectations based on objective verifiable evidence, which is an 
                                                                                                                         
thought, Senator, because I’m from the Second Circuit and as you know we don’t uphold 
patents in the Second Circuit”).  Patent theories like these are more about the absence of 
patents than about how or why we want patents to operate.  
109 The prospect and rent-dissipation theories discussed earlier are two prime 
examples.  See supra Part II.  The commercialization theory also discussed earlier differs 
from these two theories in viewing the coordination effects of the patent not as a way to 
prevent rent seeking or rent dissipating behavior but only as a way to facilitate the 
industrial organization activities necessary to get the public to enjoy some benefit from a 
nascent invention.  See supra notes 54-57, and accompanying text.  The modest roles for 
the positive law prior art rules that are contemplated in the registration theory discussed 
here are entirely compatible with the commercialization theory and its views on the 
screening function played by competitors of the patentee.  Id.   
110 See generally supra Part II.  See also Kitch, supra note 31 at 267-271 
(discussing importance of broad claims early after initial discovery).   
111 Grady and Alexander, supra note 32 at 346 (“By definition, an optimal 
proportion cannot be improved upon; rent dissipation theory, therefore, predicts patent 
nonenforcement”).  In part, the rent dissipation theory seems to be assuming that 
something may actually be “optimal” or “good” in a way that assumes a great deal.  Most 
importantly, it seems to implicitly subscribe to some type of nirvana thesis, which is 
generally shunned in the literature because no example has been offered of any human 
endeavor that is in all respects “optimal.”  See supra note 8 (critiquing nirvana 
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approach that is both workable and has explanatory power for the present 
system.112  The registration theory begins from a presumption in favor of 
not holding an invention to be unpatentable over the prior art unless some 
verifiable evidence of sufficient reliance is shown.113  Under this view, the 
system should have a novelty requirement to protect those investments 
that have matured into actual technical activities.114 Similarly, the system 
should have something like a nonobviousness requirement to protect those 
investments that are about to mature into actual technical activities.115  For 
both requirements, the system should consider only those investments that 
verifiably existed before those of the one claiming a patent right.116    
The registration theory has great explanatory power for the prior 
art rules.117  The theory’s presumption in favor of not holding an invention 
to be unpatentable over the prior art explains the often-overlooked 
introductory language to the statutory prior art provisions, which sets forth 
that “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless” any of the conditions 
subsequently provided in the statute is triggered.118  Indeed, the 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
112 Compare supra notes 48-51 (prospect and rent dissipation theories do not 
offer workable rules); and infra notes 82, 106-108 (reward theories do not offer workable 
rules either). 
113 Unlike the theories that focus on determining which claims to a patent are 
worth protecting, the registration theory focuses on determining which claims to freedom 
from patent are worth protecting.   
114 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
115 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
116 See infra notes 140-142 (discussing how dates are compared). 
117 See infra Parts IV.A.1-IV.A.4 (discussing the rules). 
118 35 U.S.C. § 102.  The many subsections of Section 102, subsections (a) 
through (g), then set forth the categories of things that can count as prior art.  Any single 
piece of prior art, sometimes also called a “reference,” will count as prior art for purposes 
of both the novelty and statutory bar analyses of Section 102 and the nonobviousness 
analysis of Section 103 if it is determined to trigger any one, or more than one, of the 
subsections of Section 102.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 554.  See also, In re Foster, 
343 F.2d 980 (CCPA 1965) (reversing In re Palmquist 319 F.2d 549 (CCPA 1963) to 
hold that despite plain meaning of the statute, art qualifying only under §102(b) may 
support an analysis under § 103).  For the reasons discussed more thoroughly by 
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registration theory also explains the otherwise controversial statutory 
language that provides such a minimal role for the Patent Office.119  In 
addition, present patent-obtaining prior art rules have been considered by 
many, including me, to be “a statutory mine field through which patent 
applicants must navigate.”120  With the benefit of the registration theory, 
they can be seen as the expected intricacies of a system rationally designed 
to consider all verifiable investments.121   
1. NOVELTY AND BAR 
The Patent System’s patent-obtaining rules relating to the prior art 
begin with those in Section 102 of the statute, which relate to novelty and 
                                                                                                                         
associated with strategic disclosure.  Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the 
Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175 (2000); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or 
Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000). 
119 See supra note 70 (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 
(Fed.Cir., 1996) (holding that because “the broadest of the [Patent Office]’s rulemaking 
powers – 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) – authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations 
directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [Patent Office];’ it does NOT grant the 
Commissioner the authority” needed to in turn entitle the Patent Office to deference due 
to other administrative agencies, which are vested with sufficient power by Congress, 
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)) 
120 See, e.g., CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 323.   
121 See infra Parts IV.A.1-IV.A.4.  What is more, in accordance with the 
registration theory’s goal of improving efforts to protect investments, many of these rules 
worked their way into our regime over time even though they were not all present at the 
outset.  See Walterscheid, supra note 60 (reviewing the first roughly 100 years of the 
prior art provisions with particular focus on the rules relating to derivation and foreign 
use); P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, TITLE 35, UNITED STATES CODE 
ANNOTATED (West 1954 ed.), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 
(1993) (reviewing history and operation of our present patent system, which is largely 
based on the 1952 Patent Act); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Ever Evolving Meaning of 
Prior Art, (pts. 1-3) 64 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 457, 571, 632 (1982), (pts. 4-
6) 65 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 3, 477, 658 (1983), (pts. 7-8) 66 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 479, 573 (1984), (pt. 9) 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 
33 (1985) (reviewing in detail the evolution of many of the prior art provisions that exist 
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bar.122  “Anticipation by the prior art” is the phrase in patent law used to 
describe the case where a patent claim is directed to subject matter that is 
not new.123  “Statutorily barred” is the phrase in patent law used to 
describe the case where a patent claim is directed to subject matter that, 
even if new at the time of invention, was exposed to the public more than 
a year before the application was filed.124  The registration view elucidates 
why it makes sense for the patent system to have evolved these doctrines 
in all their detail.125   
In accordance with the registration view, printed publications 
describing a technology count as prior art under the novelty provisions 
because publicly available documents are good evidence of investment by 
their authors and of something on which others could rely.126  Any printed 
publication will count, even if in a foreign country, as long as it is 
verifiably the type of publication on which a member of the public could 
rely.127  Indeed, even pending patent applications that later issue as patents 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
122 35 U.S.C. § 102 (“Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to 
patent”).  The mention in Section 101 of the word “new” has not been read to provide any 
separate novelty requirement.  See Federico supra note 121, at 178 (“The general part of 
the Committee Report states that section 102 ‘may be said to describe the statutory 
novelty required for patentability, and includes, in effect, an amplification and definition 
of “new” in section 101’”).  See also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (1979) (Rich, J.) 
dismissed as moot 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (“Notwithstanding the words ‘new and useful’ 
in § 101, the invention is not examined under that statute for novelty because that is not 
the statutory scheme of things or the long-established administrative practice.”).   
123 The maxim setting forth the so-called “classic infringement test for 
anticipation,” which also applies to analysis under the statutory bar, is “That which will 
infringe if later, will anticipate, if earlier.”  See CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6 at 414 (citing 
Knapp v. Morss, 150 US 221 (1893)).  For more on how this is applied in practice see 
infra notes 140-149 and accompanying text.   
124 For a discussion of the bar, which also operates as a one-year grace period for 
filing see infra notes136-139.   
125 Compare supra note 50 (rent dissipation theory does not explain case law); 
and infra note 108 (reward theories do not explain case law). 
126 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (referring to printed publications).   
127 See, In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding a single cataloged 
student thesis at Frieburg University in Germany to count as prior art because it was 
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but that are not yet published count as prior art as of their filing date 
because their inventors have invested in the verifiable contents of these 
government-stored documents, and those in confidential relationships with 
their inventors could rely on them.128   
Similarly, uses of a technology only count as prior art if 
corroborated by someone other than the one claiming prior invention 
because verifiable public may induce investment in the technology by 
observers of this use.129  Although Section 102(a) only expressly provides 
in pertinent part that the invention must not have been “known or used by 
others,” the word “public” has been read into that statutory language 
through case law.130  Use that is not public, yet also is not abandoned 
suppressed or concealed, may also count as prior art under Sections 102 
                                                                                                                         
three student theses at an American University would have counted as prior art, even 
though they were physically accessible to the public, because there was no evidence they 
were logically accessible to the interested public by, for example, being indexed in the 
library’s subject catalog).  Under the registration theory these publications should count 
as prior art because they might lead to third party reliance not because they might 
somehow be fairly said to have been available to the patentee.   
128 See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926) 
(Holmes, J.) (holding so-called secret prior art to count as prior art as of the application’s 
filing date).  The present version of this rule is codified in Section 102(e)(2).  For the 
same reasons, an application filed in foreign patent offices will also count as prior art as 
of its filing date with one of the international Patent Cooperation Treaty-designated 
patent offices, if filed according the procedural rules of the treaty, and as long as the 
application is eventually published in English and designates that it should be sent to the 
United States Patent Office.   35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1).  Also for the same reasons, under 
Section 102(e)(1), prior art effect is extended to pending applications that do not issue as 
a patent but do get published under the rule of publishing 18 months after filing, which 
was part of the 1999 American Inventors Protection Act and is codified in Section 
122(b).  However, applications that are not published pursuant to Section 122(b), such as 
those that are abandoned, do not count as prior art.  The authors of these documents are 
able to maintain their information as a trade secret but the documents themselves will not 
preclude patentability for others.  To be sure, the use by these authors may preclude 
patentability under Section 102(a) or (g), as discussed infra at note 129.   
129 The registration protects against the risk of these investments being later 
subject to a patent right to exclude by enforcing the rule that they destroy patentability.   
130 Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850) (holding the use of a 
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(f) and (g), but only if corroborated by evidence other than inventor 
testimony.131   
Verifiable public use or sale sufficiently in advance of patent 
application filing even if by the one seeking a patent can count as prior art 
against that application under certain circumstances because it may induce 
investment in the technology by observers of this use.132  For this reason, 
the statutory bar provisions treat sale or use in public by either the 
                                                 
131 See, e.g., CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 441-451 (describing evolution of 
case law treating 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) as a provision under which prior use may count as 
prior art even if not public, as long as it is not abandoned suppressed or concealed, and 
the amount of evidence needed to satisfy that provision).  See also Gambro Lundia AB v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that Section 102(f) 
prevents patentability if there can be shown to be both prior, corroborated, conception of 
the claimed invention, and its communication to the one claiming to be the first inventor).   
Where the prior inventor turns out to have sought its own patent, the Patent 
Office conducts something called an interference proceeding, which is the quasi-litigation 
process initiated when a patent application claims the same subject matter as another 
application or an issued patent to determine who is the first inventor.  For more on the rules 
governing priority disputes see infra Part IV.A.3.   
Where the prior inventor turns out to have been outside the United States, the rules 
become more complicated, as discussed infra Part IV.A.4.   
132 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  The policy goal of protecting investment has been 
recognized in the case law associated with this prior art provision.  See General Electric 
Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“First, there is a policy against 
removing inventions from the public [that] the public has justifiably come to believe are 
freely available to all as a consequence of prolonged sales activity.”).   
Often described as a statutory bar to the patenting of inventions publicized for 
more than a year, this provision operates to provide a one-year grace period for publicity 
that will not bar patentability.  The grace period entered the U.S. patent system in 1839 as 
a period of “grace” lasting two years.  5. Stat. 353.  The period was shortened to one year 
in 1939, 53 Stat. 1212, and remains so in present 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).   
Not all patent systems in the world provide a statutory grace period, although it 
is not exactly clear whether most systems end up providing one through case law.  See 
JOSEPH STRAUS, GRACE PERIODS AND THE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT 
LAW: ANALYSIS OF KEY LEGAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS (2001) (study 
commissioned by the European Patent Organization to examine whether European patent 
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inventor or a third party as prior art against the inventor’s claim to a 
patent.133 
The patent system even protects the inventor’s own investments to 
some extent through allowance of a one-year grace period in which to file 
a patent application before the on-sale and public use bars are triggered.  
This is important because a patent system in which there is no grace 
period may provide incentives for decreased rate of disclosure of new 
technologies, and a decrease in the over-all value of patents.  The 
decreased rate of disclosure under a system lacking a grace period would 
be due to the need to keep potentially patentable information unpublished 
before filing the patent application.134  The decrease in over-all value of 
patents would be due to the fear of unknown but unavoidable pre-filing 
disclosures lurking in the history of every patent.135  
But the inventor’s own investments have to be balanced against the 
reasonable reliance interests of others.  For this reason, the grace period is 
limited to one year, which allows others to rely on essentially any public 
evidence of a technology that is more than the time of the grace period.136  
As soon as an inventor’s use of the technology becomes available to the 
public,137 or is on sale at any stage past when it is “ready for patenting,” 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
133 See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (third 
party use may raise statutory bar).   
134 See STRAUS, supra note 132 (discussing incentives to suppress publication 
under a regime of no grace period).   
135 Id. (discussing decrease in value of patents under absolute novelty regimes, 
which do not have a grace period).   
136 Under the registration theory, the specific amount of time is arbitrary as long 
as it is fixed and knowable ex ante and as long as it is both long enough to allow some 
grace period effect and not long enough to unduly frustrate investment in recently public 
technologies.  For some history of the various grace periods see supra note 132.   
137 See, Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1882) (holding use even in a private 
undergarment, here corset steels, can count as prior art).  Also compare Metallizing 
Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2nd Cir. 1946) 
(Hand, J.) (use will count if it is commercial); with City of Elizabeth v. American 
Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. (7 Otto.) 126 (1878) (use will not count if merely 
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the clock on the one-year window begins.138  The subsequent one year 
provides time for the inventor to decide whether to prepare and file a 
patent application, and then to take these steps if elected.139  
Taken together, these rules about what counts as prior art allow 
every patent claim to be judged as of its “critical date” against a piece of 
prior art’s “effective date.”140  The critical date is either the verifiable date 
of invention, or one year before the application’s filing date, depending 
upon whether the invention is being analyzed for anticipation or bar.141  
The effective date is the date the piece of prior art is allowed to count as 
prior art, as discussed above.142   
Under the law of Section 102, patentability is precluded if any 
single item that is determined to count as prior art under any single 
subsection of the statute is found to fully disclose the claimed invention.143  
Importantly, case law has provided a remarkably easy test for determining 
whether an invention is fully disclosed for purposes of this analysis, which 
can be seen through the use of the schematic claim chart in Table 1, 
below.144 
                                                                                                                         
matter, actual third party public use as in Baxter Int’l v. COBE Labs., 88 F.3d 1054 
(1996) counts as prior art because it shows actual reliance.   
138 Pfaff v. Wells Electronics 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (holding the year begins when 
the technology is “subject to a commercial offer for sale” and “ready for patenting”).   
139 The importance of taking the time to prepare a good application are discussed 
infra Part IV.A.3.   
140 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 326 (providing sample analysis using these 
terms).   
141 Anticipation occurs when the claimed invention is found to have been in the 
art that existed prior to the putative inventor.  See supra notes 118-131, and 
accompanying text.  A statutory bar occurs when the application is not filed within one 
year of a bar triggering event.  See supra notes 132-138, and accompanying text.   
142 This is either the date of use, publication, or filing, depending upon which 
part of Section 102 is triggered.  See supra notes 118-131, and accompanying text.   
143 See supra note 123 (discussing basic statement of test for anticipation).   
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Table 1: 
Analysis Under § 102145 
 PAR1 
E 1 9 
E 2 9 
E …  9 
E n 9 
E * 9 
 
Table 1 compares the elements of a stylized claim against the prior 
art for a determination of potential unpatentability or invalidity under 
Section 102.146  The substantive requirement for determining no valid 
patent claim under Section 102 is triggered only if a single prior art 
                                                 
145 E1 through En represent the elements of the claim arbitrarily assigned 
numbers 1 through n.  E* represents enablement of the entire claim.  PAR1 represents any 
single prior art reference, such as a journal article, sample product, student thesis, etc.   
146 The term invalidity refers to the failure of a claim in an issued and 
successfully examined patent to satisfy one of the substantive patent-obtaining rules.  The 
term unpatentability refers to the failure of a claim in a patent application to satisfy one of 
the substantive patent-obtaining rules.  These terms are interchangeable if operating 
under a soft look system like the registration model, which does not involve any 
examination.   
The representation of a claim as a listing of its several elements in claim charts 
like Table 1 has become so common in patent cases that the local rules of some courts 
that hear many patent cases, like the Northern District of California, have for some time 
required their use.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 848-849 (discussing local rules for 
claim charts).  The identification of these elements turns largely on the interpretation, or 
construction, of a patent claim, which is treated as a matter of law for decision by the 
court, and which is the first step in any analysis of either validity or infringement because 
the claim must be construed the same for both purposes.  See generally, id. at 829-73 
(discussing the substantive and procedural law of claim interpretation after the Supreme 
Court decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).  The 
great degree of debate over the law of claim construction itself injects a degree of 
uncertainty into this otherwise relatively crisp analysis.  Recent empirical work by 
Wagner suggests that this uncertainty may lessen over time as the court develops 
predictable trends in its case law.  See www.claimconstruction.com (web page discussing 
empirical work relating to trends in the court’s law of claim construction) (last visited 
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reference discloses, either expressly or under principles of inherency, each 
and every element of the claim, plus enablement.147  When mapped onto 
this table, this means that a proper holding of invalidity will only lie if a 
check mark can be found as a matter of fact for every row.148  And to 
achieve a check mark there must be admissible evidence that as a matter 
of fact the pertinent content is present in the piece of prior art.149   
Although this determination of novelty is relatively easy, the 
registration theory recognizes that it may not go far enough in that parties 
may invest in a technology before it fully exists.150  As a result, the patent 
system may have to go farther than merely requiring inventions be new, or 
not fully disclosed in a single prior art reference; it may also have to 
prevent valid patents from covering what anyone is investing towards, if 
such a determination can be made inexpensively.151  Under the registration 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
147 See Minnesota Mining and Mfg. v. Johnson & Johnson, 976 F.2d 1559 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (Rich, J.) (invalidity under Section 102 is “a question of fact, and one who 
seeks such a finding must show that each element of the claim in issue is found, either 
expressly or under principles of inherency, in a single prior art reference”); In re Paulson, 
20 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“In addition, the reference must be enabling and describe 
the applicant’s claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it in possession of a person 
of ordinary skill in the field of the invention”).  See also In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 
745 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that 
the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the 
reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.’ Continental 
Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed.Cir.1991). ‘Inherency, however, 
may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing 
may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’ Id. at 1269.”).   
148 This represents the presence of each element in the claim, plus enablement, 
which as discussed in the case law supra note 147, is required for a finding of invalidity 
under section 102.   
149 As discussed in the case law supra note 147, invalidity under Section 102 
requires the prior art disclosure to be in a single reference.   
150 Indeed, the likelihood of these investments is logically closely tied to the 
presence in the art of a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine elements 
in the prior art to work towards the claimed invention.  The registration view thereby 
provides a justification for the case law that requires these elements as part of a 
nonobviousness analysis.  For more on the law of nonobviousness see infra Part IV.A.2 
151 The ultimate question of whether it goes far enough will turn on whether 





KIEFF  THE CASE FOR REGISTERING PATENTS  
 
theory, this is the role played by the nonobviousness requirement, 
discussed below.152   
2. NONOBVIOUSNESS  
The patent system has long demanded something more than mere 
novelty when determining patentability over the prior art; and 
nonobviousness is the present system’s iteration of this additional 
requirement.153  The various forms of this additional requirement have 
generated great difficulty for the courts for over a century.154  They also 
raise significant problems for the patent theories in the literature.155   
                                                                                                                         
(Footnote Continued) 
IV.A.2, while it is clear that the nonobviousness test does a better job on this score than 
the former “requirement for invention,” it is not entirely clear whether the case law 
relating to the test of nonobviousness has implemented the test optimally.   
152  See supra note 87 (the registration theory has explanatory power for the 
intricacies of the patent-obtaining rules while the other theories do not).   
153 For history of the nonobviousness requirement in patent law see 
WITHERSPOON infra note 40; Sirilla infra note 108.   
154 During the first half of the 1900’s when called the requirement for invention, 
before the 1952 Patent Act, it had become known as “the plaything of the judiciary.”  
Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in WITHERSPOON, supra note 40, at 
1:208.  Even after Congress wrote the Section 103 nonobviousness into the statute in the 
1952 Act another 10 years passed before the Supreme Court applied the new standard of 
nonobviousness in Graham and its companion cases.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1 (1966) (consolidated with Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., and Colgate-Palmolive 
Co. v. Cook Chem. Co.); and United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).  For an inside 
look at the Graham decision see Tom Arnold, Side Bar: the Way the Law of section 103 
Was Made, in CHISUM supra note 6, at 549-554.  Soon afterwards, The Court re-injected 
confusion by writing about synergism and combinations.  See Anderson’s-Black Rock, 
Inc., v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) (holding patent invalid because 
“No such synergistic result is argued here”); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 
(1976) (holding patent invalid because it was a mere combination of old elements and 
had no “synergistic effect”).  These terms were not weeded back out of the law until the 
creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.  See Sirilla supra note 108 at 543.  As the Federal 
Circuit has reminded:   
A requirement for “synergism” or a “synergistic effect” is 
nowhere found in the statute, 35 U.S.C. When present, for example in a 
chemical case, synergism may point toward nonobviousness, but its 
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The version of this requirement called nonobviousness was written 
into the patent system through the 1952 Act to statutorily jettison the prior 
case law associated with the former, vague and anti-patent, requirement 
called “the requirement for invention.”156  Even the drafters of this new 
standard recognized that it did not on its face appear to be any more 
precise in application than the former requirement.157  Nevertheless, as the 
registration theory would predict, the case law interpreting this new 
                                                                                                                         
The reference to a “combination patent” is equally without 
support in the statute. There is no warrant for judicial classification of 
patents, whether into “combination” patents and some other unnamed 
and undefined class or otherwise. Nor is there warrant for differing 
treatment or consideration of patents based on a judicially devised 
label. Reference to “combination” patents is, moreover, meaningless. 
Virtually all patents are “combination patents,” if by that label one 
intends to describe patents having claims to inventions formed of a 
combination of elements. It is difficult to visualize, at least in the 
mechanical-structural arts, a “non-combination” invention, i.e., an 
invention consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they exist, 
are rare indeed. 
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed.Cir.1983).   
155 See supra notes 31-51 (other theories merely point out rent seeking concerns 
that are implicated by patents and at best suggest that ex ante determinations be made 
about which patents turn out to be better at decreasing the rent-seeking type of social 
cost).   
156 See Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Section 
103 of the 1952 Patent Act, in WITHERSPOON, supra note 40, at 1:401, reprinted from 46 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 855 (1964) (Judge Rich’s speech upon receipt of the Kettering Award in 
which he discusses the role of nonobviousness in Section 103 as the replacement for the 
so-called requirement for invention); Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” 
Requirement, in WITHERSPOON, supra note 40, at 1:501, reprinted from 1 AM. PAT. L. 
ASS’N. Q.J. 26, 26 (1972) (discussing the great lag between the arrival of the new 
standard in the statute and its adoption by the courts).   
157 Compare Federico, supra note 121, at 183 (the requirement for invention “is 
an unmeasurable quantity having different meanings for different persons”) with Federico, 
supra note 121, at 184 (“The problem of what is obvious and hence unpatentable is still 





KIEFF  THE CASE FOR REGISTERING PATENTS  
 
standard correctly has provided an objective and practicable framework 
that is tied to third-party investments.158   
The analysis for a nonobviousness determination under Section 
103 begins with the entire body of prior art determined to be available 
under Section 102.159  But important areas of the prior art are then carved 
out so they can be excluded from the nonobviousness analysis.160 First, 
only art considered to be analogous may be considered under the 
nonobviousness analysis.161  Under the registration theory, which looks to 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
158 See supra notes 150-152 (discussing role of nonobviousness analysis 
according to registration theory).   
159 See Federico supra note 121, at 180: 
In form this section is a limitation on section 102 and it should more 
logically have been made part of section 102, but it was made a 
separate section to prevent 102 from becoming too long and involved 
and because of its importance.  The antecedent of the words “the prior 
art,” which here appear in a statute for the first time, lies in the phrase 
“disclosed or described as set forth in section 102” and hence these 
words refer to the material specified in section 102 as the basic for 
comparison.   
160 Although all of the Section 102 art is initially available for analysis under 
Section 103, certain types of prior art are excluded. According to the registration theory, 
these carve outs exist to remove from consideration the prior art for which the inference 
of possible innocent third party reliance is not reasonable.  See infra notes 161-165 
(discussing carve outs).    
161 The statute provides that the analysis should look to a hypothetical “person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which [the claimed] subject matter pertains” and ask 
whether to that person “the invention as a whole would have been obvious” given the 
“differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art.”  35 
U.S.C. § 103.  This in turn requires that several factual inquiries be made:  “the scope and 
content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved.”  Graham v. John Deehr Co, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).  A person having ordinary 
skill in the art according to this framework is sometimes called a PHOSITA, thanks to the 
coining of that term by Soans.  Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent 
Cases, 10 IDEA 433, 436 (1966).  The “pertinent art” is selected from among the entire set 
of prior art identified by Section 102 depending upon whether it is analogous or non-
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protect the reasonable investment-backed expectations of third parties, 
non-analogous art is properly discarded because it is not likely to be the 
basis for any such reliance.162  Importantly, as would be predicted by the 
registration theory, the distinction between analogous and non analogous 
art is viewed as important not as evidence of what the inventor himself or 
herself could have known about the art but rather what was knowable to a 
hypothetical third party person having ordinary skill in the art 
(“PHOSITA”).163  Second, secret prior art that would count only under 
                                                                                                                         
(Footnote Continued) 
 Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is 
analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, 
regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not 
within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is 
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor 
is involved.  
In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed.Cir.1992) (citations omitted).  See also, In re Paulson, 
30 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cit. 1994) (affirming Patent Office rejection under Section 103 
because references from the fields of cabinetry and desktop accessories are properly 
considered to be analogous art to a patent claim directed to a clamshell case for a laptop 
computer under the second of these two alternative criteria).   
162 See supra notes 95-96 (discussing purpose of the prior art rules under the 
registration theory).   
163 See Soans supra note 161 (coining the term PHOSITA).  Indeed, Judge Rich, 
who co-authored Section 103, has portrayed this PHOSITA “as working in his shop with 
the prior art references – which he is presumed to know – hanging on the walls around 
him.” In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (CCPA 1966) (Rich, J.) (this metaphor is 
referred to as the “Winslow Tableau”).  See also International Cellucotton Prod. Co. v. 
Sterilek Co., 94 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1938) (Hand, J.) (“[w]e must suppose the inventor to 
be endowed, as in fact no inventor is endowed; we are to impute to him knowledge of all 
that is not only in his immediate field, but in all fields nearly akin to that field.”); Custom 
Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries, Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir.1986) 
(“The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all 
the pertinent prior art.”).  Judge Rich improved upon the Winslow Tableau in In re Antle, 
444 F.2d at 1171-72:  
In Winslow we said that the principal secondary reference was “in the 
very same art” as appellant’s invention and characterized all the 
references as “very pertinent art.” The language relied on by the 
solicitor, quoted above, therefore, does not apply in cases where the 
very point in issue is whether one of ordinary skill in the art would 
have selected, without the advantage of hindsight and knowledge of the 
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Sections 102 (e, f, and g) has been statutorily excluded from the 
nonobviousness analysis if it is owned by the same entity whose patent 
claim is in issue.164  The exclusion of this art also makes sense under the 
registration theory because no third-party investments will have been 
made in art that is commonly owned and kept secret.165   
The content of the remaining prior art as a whole must then be 
surveyed to determine whether it may have reasonably triggered 
investment-backed expectations in achieving the subject matter of the 
patent claim in issue.166  Such investments are most likely to have existed 
only when there can be found among these many remaining pieces of art 
each and every element of the claimed subject matter along with sufficient 
                                                                                                                         
applied. As we also said in Winslow, “Section 103 requires us to 
presume full knowledge by the inventor of the prior art in the field of 
his endeavor”, but it does not require us to presume full knowledge by 
the inventor of prior art outside the field of his endeavor, i.e., of “non 
analogous” art. In that respect, it only requires us to presume that the 
inventor would have that ability to select and utilize knowledge from 
other arts reasonably pertinent to his particular problem which would 
be expected of a man of ordinary skill in the art to which the subject 
matter pertains 
164 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (providing carve outs).  The carve outs for 102(f and 
g) were added in 1984 to reverse the holding in In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 
1973).  98 Stat. 3384.  The carve outs for 102(e) was added in 1999 through Section 4807 
of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999. 113 Stat. 1501.  For a discussion of 
the history of these carve outs see CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6, at 575-578.   
165  No carve out is needed for the novelty analysis because the co-onwer can 
keep the information sufficiently secret before the later claim that the refrence will not 
trigger any of the subsections of Section 102, except perhaps 102(f).  For this subsection, 
derivation, the co-owner can seek a claim by naming the first inventor, who’s activity is 
co-owned.  If the earlier reference does not disclose enough to invalidate under a novelty 
analysis then it would not have been possible for the subject matter to have been claimed 
at the time of the earlier reference and the only opportunity to claim the subject matter is 
at the later time.  The exclusion of the prior art from a nonobviousness analysis at that 
later time helps ensure leaves open the possibility of it being covered by a claim.  Since 
the subject matter is co-owned with the prior art and is not otherwise available under any 
of the other subsections of 102, it also is not the target of third-party investment.    
166 See supra note 115 (discussing the goal of the nonobviousness requirement 
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teaching, motivation or suggestion (“TMS”) for the pieces that contain 
those elements to be combined such that there would be a reasonable 
expectation of success (“RES”) in establishing the claimed subject matter 
when they are combined.167  The practical operation of this analysis can be 
seen through the use of the schematic claim chart in Table 2, below.   
                                                 
167  According to the Federal Circuit:   
The consistent criterion for determination of obviousness is whether the 
prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that 
this process should be carried out and would have a reasonable 
likelihood of success, viewed in the light of the prior art. Both the 
suggestion and the expectation of success must be founded in the prior 
art, not in the applicant’s disclosure. 
In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).  See also 
CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6, at 584-597 (discussing contours of this analysis in practice 
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Table 2:  
Analysis Under § 103168 
 PAR1 PAR2 
E 1  9 
E 2 9  
E …   9 
E n 9  
E *  9 
TMS 9  
RES  9 
 
                                                 
168 As in Table 1, E1 through En represent the elements of the claim arbitrarily 
assigned numbers 1 through n; and E* represents enablement of the entire claim.  In this 
table, PAR1 and PAR2 each represent any single prior art reference, such as a journal 
article, sample product, student thesis, etc.  The key to the analysis under Section 103 is 
that it permits the looking to more than one reference in the prior art to find all the 
elements of the claim plus enablement but only if in those references there can also be 
found (1) a teaching, motivation, or suggestion (TMS in the table) for those references to 
be combined to form the claimed subject matter as well as (2) a reasonable expectation of 
success (RES in the Table) that the claimed subject matter will result when the references 
are so combined.   
The apparent crispness of this framework may be somewhat illusory for several 
reasons.  First, as with Table 1, there is some uncertainty regarding claim construction.  
See supra note 168 (discussing uncertainty about the law of claim construction and its 
application in any given case). Second, as discussed supra note 161, the determination of 
obviousness is to be done from the perspective of a PHOSITA, and the case law leaves 
some substantial uncertainty as to how this hypothetical person is to be conceptualized.  
The Federal Circuit has provided a number of factors to consider when determining the 
characteristics of the PHOSITA:  
Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in 
the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of 
problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those 
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) 
sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of the 
workers in the field. 
Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed.Cir.1983).  See 
also CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6 at 597-600 (discussing the case law relating to the 
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Like Table 1, Table 2 compares the elements of a stylized claim 
against the prior art, but this time for a determination of nonobviousness 
under Section 103.169  Invalidity under this rule of nonobviousness also 
requires the presence in the prior art reference either expressly or under 
principles of inherency of each and every element of the claim, plus 
enablement; but unlike the analysis under Section 102, the analysis under 
Section 103 allows the elements to be spread among two or more 
individual pieces of prior art, as long as there is also present in those 
pieces of prior are some additional facts:  teaching motivation or 
suggestion to combine those references to obtain the subject matter of the 
claim as a whole (“TMS”), plus a reasonable expectation of success in 
achieving the claimed subject matter upon the combination (“RES”).170  
When mapped onto this table, this means that a proper holding of 
invalidity or unpatentability under Section 103 will only lie if a check 
mark can be found as a matter of fact for every row and at least some tie 
can be made across all columns using the TMS and RES that must be 
found in at least one of the rows.171 
Unfortunately, the appropriateness of the nonobviousness 
requirement is not entirely clear under the registration theory.  To the 
extent that the analysis operates essentially as crisply as suggested by 
Table 2, it makes sense as a reasonably inexpensive way to protect against 
verifiable investments that may have been made towards a technology.172  
However, the practice may deviate some from this framework when 
requiring in every case some weight be attributed to the so-called 
secondary considerations of nonobviousness: chiefly, commercial success 
                                                 
169 See supra note 146 (discussing the validity and patentability analyses).   
170 For a discussion of the case law leading up to this composite test see supra 
notes 159-167.    
171 The nonobviousness analysis is presently pertinent when determining 
patentability before the Patent Office and when determining validity in litigation but 
under a soft-look system would only be relevant in litigation.  See supra note 146.   
172 See supra notes 150-152  (discussing role of nonobviousness under 
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and long felt need and failure of others.173  Long felt need and failure by 
others may not represent a deviation and may instead fit well within the 
registration theory’s framework as outlined in Table 2 because they may 
be evidence that is probative of a lack of TMS and RES, in which case the 
art may fairly be said to “teach away” from the failed approaches.174   
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
173 As The Court in Graham stated when describing these secondary 
considerations and their purpose:   
Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but 
unresolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light 
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought 
to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these 
inquiries may have relevancy . . .  
These legal inferences or subtests do focus attention on economic and 
motivational rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more 
susceptible of judicial treatment than are the highly technical facts 
often present in patent litigation.... Such inquires may lend a helping 
hand to the judiciary which, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, is 
most ill fitted to discharge the technological duties cast upon it by 
patent litigation. They may also serve to “guard against slipping into 
use of hindsight,” and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art 
the teachings of the invention in issue. 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 35-36 (1966).  It is important to 
realize that even this initial Supreme Court statement of the secondary 
considerations raises the specter of endeavoring to judge the technological merit 
of the record rather than its factual content, as the registration theory would 
require.  That is, under the registration theory the framework is a factual one that 
anyone well skilled in trial and appellate practice can use while The Court seems 
to be suggesting a deeper foray into the technological merit by speaking of 
“technological duties.”   
The Federal Circuit has gone further than the Supreme Court in 
Graham by requiring:  “evidence rising out of the so called ‘secondary 
considerations’ must always when present be considered en route to a 
determination of obviousness.”  Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corporation, 713 
F.2d 1530, 1538-39 (Fed.Cir.1983).  See also CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6, at 
601-612 (discussing the case law and commentary on the secondary 
considerations and collecting sources).   
174 See supra note 167 (discussing TMS and RES).  See also In re Gurley, 27 
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In contrast, commercial success may deviate materially from the 
framework of the registration theory, although for reasons different than 
identified in the literature.175  Exemplifying the literature critical of the 
commercial success factor Merges urges that the system will operate better 
when “focus returns to the invention’s technical merits” because we 
should question “the spurious inferential connection between success and 
significant technical advance.”176  In his work on the prospect theory Kitch 
takes a different view of commercial success arguing that this factor 
matters under the prospect theory because it shows that the patent has 
become “the foundation for a series of now valuable contract rights.177  On 
first blush it may appear that the commercialization theory would view 
commercial success the same way, for similar reasons. That is, 
commercial success might be seen as relevant not because it says 
something about how hard it was to make the invention but only because it 
says something about how commercially relevant the subject matter has 
become.178   
                                                                                                                         
A reference may be said to teach away when a person of 
ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from 
following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a 
direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant. The 
degree of teaching away will of course depend on the particular facts; 
in general, a reference will teach away if it suggests that the line of 
development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be 
productive of the result sought by the applicant. 
175 In his work pre-dating the prospect theory Kitch pointed out that commercial 
success may be a poor indicator of the nonobviousness of an invention because it relies 
upon too long of a chain of doubtful inferences between the eventual success and the 
original state of the art. Edmund Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for 
Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 332-33 (1966).   
176 Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 838-39 (1988) (citing Kitch supra 
note 174).   
177 Kitch supra note 31, at 283.   
178 See Kieff supra note 11 at 707-10 (discussing the commercialization theory’s 
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While the commercial success consideration may seem to map on 
to the incentive to commercialize discussed earlier, it is not clear that this 
factor should be considered if minimizing social cost is the goal.179  With 
the benefit of the registration and commercialization theories combined, 
commercial success may turn out to be properly ignored as a potential 
factor of nonobviousness because the factor places too much focus on the 
merits of the invention, which leads to it not being workable, and not 
enough focus on the investment-backed expectations by third parties, 
which is what matters under these theories.180  Therefore, in the final 
analysis, it may not be advisable to abandon the Section 103 requirement 
of nonobviousness in its entirety because most of the nonobviousness 
framework is shown to both work well according to the registration theory 
and be well explained by the registration theory.181   
                                                 
179 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing registration 
theory’s goals of minimizing social cost).   
180 See supra notes 28, 82, 106-107 and accompanying text (discussing problems 
with focus on the merits of the inventions).  See also supra notes 93-103 and 
accompanying text (discussing importance of investment-backed expectations by third 
parties).  In cases where enough time has gone by for there to be evidence of commercial 
success there is usually an infringer or two and then the court is left trying to decide 
whether to decide in favor of the coordination benefits of patents or in favor of protecting 
the investments of the infringers.  In a single-cycle game it may be easy to decide in favor 
of protecting the infringer’s investment.  But in a multi-cycle game such a rule would 
provide incentives to infringe too much and in an uncoordinated fashion and so instead 
the coordination benefits dominate and evidence of commercial success or lack thereof 
should be ignored not required.   
181 To the extent the secondary factors so soften the crispness of the framework 
modeled in Table 2, the net benefits of the entire nonobviousness standard may fade and 
it should then be abandoned in its entirety.  See supra note 48 (suggesting that the 
registration theory may not require the nonobviousness standard and noting that Kitch 
supra note 31 may not be to the contrary).  This conclusion, although admittedly not this 
reasoning, accords with the views of at least one framer of the 1952 Act who described 
nonobviousness as “the heart of the patent system and the justification of patent grants.”  
Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the Invention Requirement, 1 AM. PAT. L. ASS’N. Q.J. 
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3. FIRST-TO-INVENT  
The patent system’s rules governing priority contests between two 
or more claimants to a patent right protect investment by awarding the 
patent to the one who was first to invent, not first to file.182  As recognized 
by the commercialization theory, a shift to a first-to-file system may lead 
to an increased likelihood that neither party in a priority dispute will 
remain with a valid patent because the increased incentive to file early that 
may operate to make one party a winner on priority might also have 
caused that party to file an application with a disclosure that is inadequate 
to make the patent valid.183   
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
182 While priority under a first-to-file system is awarded to the application that is 
filed first regardless of priority of invention, under a first-to-invent system like the 
present patent system, priority is awarded to the to the first inventor.  See Kieff supra 
note 11, at 749-50 (discussing differences between these two types of priority regimes 
and collecting sources).   
183 As explained by the commercialization theory when discussing incentive to 
file early and its interaction with the disclosure requirements:   
A hastily filed application is more likely to be found invalid 
for nonenablement or lack of written description under recent Federal 
Circuit case law. See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200, 
1213-18 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying the statutory requirement that the 
text of the patent application as filed contain sufficient disclosure to 
enable one in the art to make and use whatever is covered by patent 
claims as eventually issued and applying separate written description 
requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Vas-Cath Inc. v. 
Mahurkur, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-67 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
statute also requires the text of the patent application as filed to satisfy 
the separate and distinct written description requirement so as to 
reasonably convey to those in the art exactly what is covered by the 
patent claims as eventually issued); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 
1213-18 (applying separate written description requirement to claims in 
the field of biotechnology); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (solidifying the court’s position on a separate written 
description requirement); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (further solidifying the 
court’s position on a separate written description requirement); 
Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(applying the same written description requirement to the field of 
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In contrast, under a first-to-invent system there is less of an 
incentive to rush to file because priority is not determined by filing and as 
a result there is a lower likelihood that the winner on priority will be left 
with a patent that fails the disclosure requirements.184  The fist-to-invent 
system thereby at least protects the investments of one of the claimants.185  
In addition, first-to-file may lead to a winner-take-all mind set for those 
seeking patents, which in turn may cause a reduction in the beneficial 
inducing power of the reward because each potential claimant may find 
the possibility of winning the race to be too low; or alternatively it may 
cause the harmful, rent-dissipating power to increase as the increase in 
uncertainty causes even more individuals to gamble on winning the 
race.186   
A first-to-invent regime does increase litigation frequency by 
bringing priority disputes to available contests, but this is beneficial 
because such disputes can also reach issues of validity.187  The costs of 
determining validity in such a proceeding are likely to be less than in a 
hard-look examination because the opponent in such a priority dispute is 
like the alleged infringer in litigation in its ability to more cheaply obtain 
and evaluate the information needed to determine validity.188  The 
                                                                                                                         
(Footnote Continued) 
1437, 1479-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (indicating that the written description 
requirement is not limited to complex technologies but applies equally 
to simple technologies, like sofa recliners). 
Kieff supra note 11, at 750, n. 239.   
184 The reasoning here is similar to that for the one year grace period.  See supra 
note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the grace period to allow 
time to file a properly drafted application when measured under the disclosure 
requirements of Section 112).  For more on the disclosure requirements see infra Part 
IV.B.   
185 The investments of the one who wins the priority dispute are protected.   
186 See Kieff supra note 11, at 711 (discussing Grady & Alexander supra note 32 
and the problem of  rent seeking and rent dissipating effects in patent law)).   
187 See Charles L. Gholz, Interferences, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 511-
513 (describing the interference process and its ability to reach issues of validity).   
188 The parties to the priority dispute either have the information relating to the 
prior art themselves because their own work is being used as prior art against each other 
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registration theory thereby explains the persistence of the first-to-invent 
aspect of the present patent system despite harmonization efforts to have 
the United States match the rest of the world, which uses first-to-file.189   
4. PRIOR FOREIGN USE 
Like the rules governing novelty, generally, the rules about prior 
foreign use make sense under the registration theory as tools for protecting 
those verifiable investment backed expectations.190  For most of the past 
century, prior use that was outside of this country would not count for 
purposes of either staking a claim to priority for purposes of obtaining 
patent rights in a priority contest or defeating patent rights in a challenge 
to validity.191  But since about the beginning of 1994 uses that occur in 
countries that are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) and the World Trade Organization “(WTO”) will be available 
when seeking to obtain a patent in a priority dispute against another 
claimant – as a sword – but not when seeking to defeat a patent owned by 
another – as a shield.192   
By making prior foreign use that occurs within a country with 
whom we are a trading partner under either of these treaties available to 
support a claim to a patent these revisions protect those investment-backed 
expectations made abroad that are sufficiently serious to have lead to the 
                                                                                                                         
ordinary defendant in a litigation who is serving the screening function identified by the 
commercialization theory.  See supra notes 61-66 (discussing the screening function).   
189 See Kieff supra note 11, at 748-50 (discussing harmonization efforts in 
relation to first-to-file and first-to-invent).   
190 See supra note 112 (registration theory on prior art rules and the goal of 
protecting investment-backed expectations based on objective verifiable evidence).   
191 This is in contrast with the impact of prior use as discussed supra notes 129-
131 and accompanying text (discussing rules relating to prior use).   
192 See 35 U.S.C §§ 102(g) and 104 (as amended by P.L. 103-182, Dec. 8, 1993, ҝ 
331, 107 Stat. 2113; P.L. 103-465, Dec. 8, 1994, ҝ 531(a), 108 Stat. 4982).  For more on 
the operation of these new provisions see CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6, at 489-491 
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filing of a patent application.193  By leaving all other foreign prior use 
unavailable to defeat a patent, these revisions protect the investments of 
the one who filed the patent application and disregard those of others 
whose use is not corroborated by a printed publication.194  The registration 
theory’s focus on verifiable evidence of potential investment-backed 
expectations thereby explains what may otherwise appear to be an intricate 
effort to favor domestic interests.   
B. THE DISCLOSURE RULES HELP COORDINATE  
Under the registration theory, the Section 112195 disclosure 
requirements decrease social costs by serving to give clear notice about 
the property right, and to decrease the chance of duplicative efforts 
towards the same invention.196  The Federal Circuit’s strong reading of the 
written description requirement to put the public on clear notice of what 
will infringe and what will not makes sense because the patentee as the 
drafter is the least cost avoider of such ambiguities.197  This legal 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
193 See supra note 112 (registration theory on prior art rules and the goal of 
protecting investment-backed expectations based on objective verifiable evidence).   
194 As discussed supra notes 126-127 (printed publications anywhere in the 
world may be available as prior art because they are verifiable).   
195 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1-2 (setting forth the disclosure requirements of patent 
law:  (1) written description; (2) enablement; (3) best mode; and (4) definiteness, which 
is also stated as the requirement that the claims “particularly point out and distinctly 
claim”).  The requirements of enablement, written description, and best mode are each 
judged by comparing the claims as issued to the application as filed.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 
¶ 1 (requirements of the specification as filed); 35 U.S.C. § 132 (prohibition against 
adding new matter).  For a discussion of the operation of the disclosure requirements see 
CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6, at 161-322.   
196 This signaling function is recognized by Kitch in his discussion of the 
prospect theory.  Kitch, supra note 31, at 287 (“The purpose of the description in the 
patent is not to disclose commercially relevant technology, but to provide context in 
which the legal limits of the claim acquire meaning.”).   
197 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212-13 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (applying the statutory requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that the text of the patent 
application as filed contain sufficient disclosure to enable one in the art to make and use 
whatever is covered by patent claims as eventually issued); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 
935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires the text 
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development was controversial to be sure; yet it marks an important 
weapon in the system’s arsenal for fighting social cost.  Pro-patent 
arguments that are against this development because it leads to the 
invalidation of particular patents should be ignored because this 
requirement helps to minimize the social cost of the system.198  Anti-
patent arguments that particular patents – such as those on gene fragments, 
for example – should also be ignored because such patents are much less 
likely to cause the pernicious clogging of downstream innovation than 
feared199 since under this case law many such downstream activities would 
not infringe most such valid claims.200   
                                                                                                                         
(Footnote Continued) 
requirement so as to reasonably convey to those in the art exactly what is covered by the 
patent claims as eventually issued); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (applying a 
separate written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Fiers v. 
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (solidifying the court’s position on a 
separate written description requirement); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (solidifying further the court’s position on a 
separate written description requirement); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 
1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the same written description requirement to the 
field of computer software); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478-
80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the written description requirement is not limited to 
complex technologies and applies equally to simple technologies, like sofa recliners).  
See also S. Leslie Misrock & Stephen S. Rabinowitz, Side Bar: The Inventor’s 
Gamble:Written Description and Prophetic Claiming of Biotechnology Inventions, in 
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 319.   
198 Because the applicant’s patent attorney drafts the disclosure for the patent 
application before filing, she is the least cost avoider of litigation on compliance with the 
disclosure requirements as long as the legal standards for these requirements are clear and 
attainable.   
199 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 6; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6; Eisenberg, 
Norms of Science, supra note 6; Eisenberg, Experimental Use, supra note 6; Eisenberg, 
Public Research, supra note 6.   
200 F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Norms of Science - A Response to Rai & Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 699-
700 (2000)  (showing why a patent claim directed to a gene fragment like an EST cannot 
be construed to cover a larger DNA sequence, such as a substantial portion of an entire 
gene, and citing Kieff, supra note 11 at 721-22 (noting that if the patentee attempts to 
argue that the claim to the smaller fragment covers the fragment within the environment 
of the larger DNA, then the claim is likely to be held invalid over the prior art or for lack 
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Although not strictly-speaking a requirement about the content of a 
patent application, the new statutory requirement for publication of 
applications eighteen months after filing201 is properly considered here 
because it can operate similarly to the disclosure requirements in 
improving the important signaling function patents play in controlling the 
potential rent-seeking, and therefore rent-dissipating, behavior of those 
others who also might be working towards the same invention as claimed 
in the patent.202  Indeed, the registration model explored in this paper 
would go a great deal further towards disseminating information about 
patent applications by posting them on the world-wide-web for free as 
soon after filing as administratively practicable.203   
                                                                                                                         
nonobvious, and the patent application must disclose the metes and bounds of the claimed 
subject matter with physical and chemical detail as well as how to make and use it; and 
alternatively pointing out that since ESTs exist in nature in the company of the other 
DNA of the genome, a typical EST claim must be limited in order to overcome this prior 
art to a version of the EST in some specific environment other than its natural one, such 
as isolated from all other DNA or inserted into an artificially engineered piece of DNA, 
and the details of the degree of isolation or of the engineered piece of DNA must also be 
provided so as to satisfy the disclosure requirements)). 
201 Pub L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (eighteen month publication of 
applications). 
202 Thus, the 18-month publication provision of patent law is one for which the 
prospect and rent-dissipating theories discussed supra Part II also have good explanatory 
power.   
203 For a discussion of the registration model see supra Part IIIB.  Although the 
registration theory suggests adoption of the registration model and immediate 
publication, the registration theory may not be quite as supportive of such pre-issuance 
publication under an examination system like the present one because it will have to 
reach compromises that are undoubtedly fair from a systemic perspective but that will 
yield a variety of incentives for strategic behavior, such as the incentive by competitors to 
before grant of the patent use the publication to teach them how to engage in as much 
otherwise infringing activity as possible, and the incentives to achieve a stronger 
bargaining position against a competitor using the leverage of its investments based on a 
public use up to just under 36 months before publication of the application (based on the 
combined one-year grace period and the 18 month publication windows).  For a 
discussion of the legislative compromises reached under the 18-month publication 
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C. SUMMARY: THE NAME OF THE GAME IS THE CLAIM 
The registration theory’s view that the patent system can and 
should operate to minimize social costs is confirmed by recent and 
important empirical work including by Allison and Lemley, which shows 
that by almost any measure patents are becoming what they call “more 
complex” over time.204  The increase in the number of prior art references 
cited and the length of prosecution before the Patent Office, which Alison 
and Lemley identify and then use as proxies for complexity, can be seen as 
evidence that issued patents are getting better scrutiny without moving 
towards a hard-look system.205  Furthermore, the increase in variation 
among patents identified by the Allison and Lemley paper and can be seen 
as evidence of increased selectivity in deciding which patents get the 
increased scrutiny.206   
The combination of these two effects provides some evidence that 
it is patentees themselves who are acting to rationally choose to increase 
                                                 
204 JOHN R. ALLISON & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF THE 
UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM, U.C. BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW PUBLIC LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 66 (2001), available online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=281395 (providing empirical evidence on complexity of 
patents).   
205 Compare, e.g., JOSH LERNER, WHERE DOES STATE STREET LEAD? A FIRST 
LOOK AT FINANCE PATENTS, 1971-2000, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH WORKING 
PAPER NO. 7918, 29 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7918 (suggesting 
that poor patent quality of some early business method patents may be due to their 
relatively anemic citation of prior art, which is one of the complexity parameters explored 
by Allison and Lemley supra, note 204).   
206 Patent applicants and their patent attorneys draft the patent disclosure and 
claims.  The Patent Office can reject or allow the claims but otherwise has only limited 
input to the content.  For an overview of the process of arguing to the Patent Office for 
the right to a patent, which is called “patent prosecution” see CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6, 
at 91-128.  The increase in variation seen by Allison and Lemley is therefore evidence 
that some patentees are choosing to seek patents that are less likely to withstand 
challenge in court and others are seeking patents that are more likely to withstand 
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scrutiny on only those patents they believe to be most important.207  If so, 
then they are acting in a way that both internalizes and mitigates social 
cost.208   
Patentees are motivated to rationally choose to behave this way 
because they face a complex gamble when selecting claim scope.209  The 
several requirements for patentability discussed above operate in concert 
to force a form of self-discipline on patent scope that mitigates the 
complex economic concerns explored by Merges and Nelson.210  As Judge 
Rich often said about patents, “the name of the game is the claim ... [and] 
the function of claims is to enable everyone to know, without going 
through a lawsuit, what infringes the patent and what does not.”211  
                                                 
207 That is, this may be evidence of a type of self-screening by the patentees 
themselves based on what challenges to validity they anticipate their competitors might 
mount.  See supra notes 61-66 (discussing the screening function).   
208 Those patents that are getting better treatment up front by the applicants are 
less likely to cause the pernicious impact associated with the one-click patent discussed 
supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text, which is caused by any issued patent that is 
legally presumed valid because it issued yet nevertheless quite likely to be help invalid in 
court in practice.  See supra Part III (comparing the advantages of the registration model 
over the present examination practice).   
209 Many of the important decisions facing a patentee must be made ex ante 
before filing the application for several reasons.  First, the disclosure requirements 
compare the claims as issued against the application as filed.  See supra Part IV.B.  
Second, the statutory bar aspects of the prior art requirements measure the claims as 
issued against the state of the art at filing.  See supra Part IV.A.1.  Therefore, patentees 
must always balance the time needed to write a sufficient disclosure against the chance 
this time will allow for the creation of so-called “intervening art,” because it came into 
existence between the date of invention and the date of filing.   
210 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 845 (1990) (exploring economic implications of 
varying patent scope).   
211 See, e.g. Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of 
Claims — American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 
499, 501 (1990) as quoted in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 
1512, 1539 (Plager, Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge Archer and Circuit Judges 
Rich and Lourie join, dissenting) (emphasis in original).  While Judge Rich made these 
remarks in a discussion about the benefits of the present examination system, they are 
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According to Judge Rich, claims present a fundamental dilemma for every 
patentee because “the stronger a patent the weaker it is and the weaker a 
patent the stronger it is.”212  By this he meant that a broad patent claim is 
strong on offense because it covers more and therefore is more likely to be 
infringed, but it also is weak on defense because it may cover something 
in the prior art or fail to contain a sufficiently detailed disclosure, and 
therefore is more likely to be invalid; while a narrow claim is weak on 
offense, because it covers less and therefore is less likely to be infringed, 
but it also is strong on defense because it may not cover something in the 
prior art or fail to contain a sufficiently detailed disclosure, and therefore 
also is less likely to be invalid.213   
To be sure, a patentee’s offensive drive is strong, but it is also 
strongly undercut by the defensive drive via the linkage through claim 
breadth.214  This is because the costs of preparing a patent with claims of 
meaningful scope are substantial while an adjudication of invalidity 
destroys all private value of the patent.215  The patentee’s drafting 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
212 See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 
35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967) (responding to proposed legislation S. 1042 and 
H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and Report of the President’s Commission on the 
Patent System (1966)). 
213 Id. (explaining patentee’s dilemma, or “puzzle”).   
214 See supra notes 211-213 (discussing the linkage).   
215 Although the filing fees paid to the Patent Office are relatively modest, the 
costs of attorney and client time to draft a disclosure that will comply with the patent-
obtaining requirements can be well over 10 times that amount.  As of January 1, 2003, 
under 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a) the basic filing fee is $750, or $375 for what the Patent Office 
views as a “small entity.”  The attorney fees for preparing and prosecuting the 
application, are described by Lemley as follows:   
  Prosecuting patents is expensive.  There is some 
disagreement on precisely how expensive it is, but the general range of 
costs for prosecuting a patent from start to finish (including application 
and various filing fees paid to the PTO, and attorney’s fees not only to 
prepare and file the application, but to respond to office actions and 
continue prosecution through to issuance or abandonment) appears to 
be $10,000 to $30,000 per patent.  I have chosen a conservative average 
estimate of $20,000 per initial application taken through prosecution.  





KIEFF  THE CASE FOR REGISTERING PATENTS  
 
decisions before filing must take into consideration several factors.  
Compliance with the disclosure requirements when tested in litigation 
looks to the disclosure made at filing.216  In addition, because the best 
information about validity is most likely to be held by parties other than 
the patentee,217 the patentee experiences substantial incentive either to err 
on the side of narrowness or to obtain that information so the patent can be 
drafted around it.218  It is this incentive for the patentee to make its own 
correct determination of validity and scope before filing that helps explain 
the evidence discussed above from Allison and Lemley that patentees 
themselves are making decisions that tend to keep their own patent scope 
“just right” from a social perspective.219  Therefore, as suggested by the 
registration theory, there are a number of essential registration aspects 
inherent in the present examination system and they help it minimize 
social costs. 
V. LESSONS FROM THE MODEL FOR THE PRESENT PATENT SYSTEM  
The registration model and its accompanying registration theory 
show that the present patent system, which is based on examination, in 
                                                                                                                         
meeting with the inventor, writing the application, and writing patent 
claims, as well as a substantial filing fee to the PTO.  Other costs are 
incurred on a piecemeal basis as prosecution progresses, and include 
both attorney’s fees and PTO fees to file each new piece of paper, up to 
and including the issuance of the patent itself.  These cost averages 
include both patents that are ultimately issued and patent applications 
that are ultimately rejected by the PTO without being revived. 
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1498-9.  (footnotes omitted) (collecting sources).   
216 See supra note 195 (discussing the disclosure rules).   
217 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the many types of prior art that are in the 
hands of those other than the patentee).   
218 A patent claim that end up covering any part of the prior art is invalid.  See 
supra note 123.  Under the registration theory, post issuance procedures that are available 
to amend the claims under the present examination system should be avoided to ensure 
that the patent applicant has the strongest incentive possible to get right the document that 
is registered and published and on which everyone will rely.   
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fact operates with many registration aspects.220  Nevertheless, the 
registration theory shows how the system could be improved by a number 
of reforms of varying severity.  More specifically, the registration theory 
elucidates the benefits of a number of reforms relating to statutory subject 
matter and utility, the Doctrine of Equivalents (“DOE”), deference to the 
Patent Office, and post issuance procedures, which could all be adopted 
without switching to a fully soft-look system like the registration model.221  
The registration theory also elucidates the benefits of reforms relating to 
litigation of patents and the presumption of validity that essentially would 
have the effect of switching to a soft-look system like the registration 
model.222   
A. REFORMS FOR SUBJECT MATTER AND UTILITY  
The Section 101223 requirements of utility and statutory subject 
matter should be amended to avoid the public choice and administrative 
costs they have inflicted over the years.224  Both of these requirements 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
220 See supra Part IV.   
221 See infra Parts V.A-V.D (discussing reforms relating to statutory subject 
matter and utility, DOE, deference to the Patent Office, and post issuance procedures).   
222 See infra Part V.E (discussing reforms relating to litigation of patents and the 
presumption of validity).   
223 35 U.S.C. § 101 (statutory subject matter and utility).   
224 A variety of per se exclusions in patent law have been perceived. See, e.g, 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding living organisms not per se 
unpatentable); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“A claim drawn to subject 
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a 
mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc) (computer system for producing a smooth waveform on a 
raster display is patentable subject matter); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999) (hub 
and spoke mutual fund accounting system is patentable subject matter).   
The central problem with these perceived exclusions is that they did not provide 
workable distinctions ex ante between what would prospectively be considered the line 
between the patentable and the unpatentable, leaving decision-makers to entertain 
arguments about a special exception in any case from anyone able to fund the attack.  See 
supra note 81 (discussing some public choice problems associated with this type of 
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have been used to invalidate patents or deny patents based on arguments 
that make no sense when mapped onto the patent system.225   
Although Section 101 of the statute is generally viewed as setting 
forth two requirements for patentability – utility and subject matter – the 
case law provides some authority for the proposition that this section is 
either merely prefatory, or designed to rule in what years of case law had 
tried to rule out.  Section 101 provides in its entirety:   
§ 101. Inventions patentable 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
                                                                                                                         
225
software business from gaining sufficient traction to organize itself into anything but an 
industry characterized by a single large player – Microsoft.  See Kieff supra note 11, at 
744 (the inability to obtain meaningful “patent protection for software for such a large 
and important portion of the industry’s life may have contributed to the continued 
unchallenged dominance of a huge entity like Microsoft.”).  The result was bleak and 
remarkably reminiscent of the one described by Dickens:   
As the Patent Office in London’s Inn, the made ‘a draft of the 
Queens bill’, of my invention, and a ‘docket of the bill’.  I paid five 
pound, ten, and six, for this.  They ‘engrossed two copies of the bill; 
one for the Signet Office, and one for the Privy-Seal Office’.  I paid 
one pound, seven, and six, for this.  Stamp duty over and above, three 
pound.  The Engrossing Clerk of the same office engrossed the Queen’s 
bill for signature.  I paid him one pound, one.  Stamp-duty again, one 
pound, ten.  I was next to take the Queen’s bill to the Attorney-General 
again, and get it signed again.  I took it, and paid five pound more.  I 
fetched it away, and took it to the Home Secretary again.  He sent it to 
the Queen again.  She signed it again.  I paid five pound thirteen, and 
six, more, for this.  I had been over a month at Thomas Joy’s.  I was 
quite wore out, patience and pocket.   
CHARLES DICKENS, A POOR MAN’S TALE OF A PATENT, 18-19 (Jeremy Phillips, ed. ESC 
Publishing Ltd. 1984) (including Appendices about the “circumlocution office” described 
to be “(as everybody knows without being told) the most important Department under 
Government”).   
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therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title. 
During a surprisingly active exchange of cases between the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (predecessor court to 
the Federal Circuit), involving the famous cases of Bergy and 
Chakrabarty, the anatomy of this statute was carefully dissected.226   The 
court decided that “in 1952 Congress voiced its intent to consider the 
novelty of an invention under § 102 where it is first made clear what the 
statute means by “new”, notwithstanding the fact that this requirement is 
first Named in § 101.”227  The same reasoning would support the view that 
the word “utility” should be considered under the disclosure requirements 
of Section 112, such as “enablement,” despite the fact that it is first named 
in Section 101 as well.   
 If statutory construction approach is unconvincing, a review of 
theory may be.  The utility requirement should be low because the 
requirement itself serves no economic purpose.  A useless patent will not 
be infringed.228  Moreover, for a patent that lacks utility because of a lack 
of practical application, at least the information published in the patent 
teaches something good (and again no one will infringe).  If there is lack 
of utility that is due to the inventor getting wrong the science or 
engineering underlying the alleged invention, then the information 
published is valuable in teaching others what not to do.  Finally, a patent 
                                                 
226 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959-964 (CCPA 1979) (Rich, J.) dismissed as 
moot, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (companion case to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980))  
227 Id. at 961.   
228 Kieff, supra note 11 at 721-22 (showing why the utility requirement is itself 
useless and why lack of utility arguments are most generously viewed as non-
infringement of a properly construed claim so as to avoid the apparently inconsistent 
position of a defendant showing the activity to be of sufficient use to have prompted the 
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of uncertain commercial utility provides incentives for the patentee to 
license broadly.229   
 The case law controlled by Brana has largely adopted this view 
and today, as a matter of positive law, courts give a great deal of deference 
to a patent applicant’s assertion of utility.230  To some extent this case law 
may be inconsistent with outstanding Supreme Court precedent in 
Manson.231   Because a utility requirement would not protect any 
investment-backed expectations, the registration theory suggests the 
requirement should be simply abandoned.232   
The statutory subject matter requirement should also be low – 
fixed at “anything under the sun made by man”233 – to avoid both the 
problems of setting categories of subject matter and the inevitable wasteful 
costs that would be spent by parties near the margins between 
categories.234 The charge that the law must change to accommodate the 
                                                 
(Footnote Continued) 
229 Id. at 712-714 (discussing the powerful incentive to license broadly that is 
caused by risks of commercialization, such as those that would obtain where commercial 
utility is uncertain).   
230 According to the Federal Circuit, a two-step analysis is required: 
[First, the Patent Office or alleged infringer] has the initial burden of 
challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the 
disclosure. [Second] [o]nly after the [challenger] provides evidence 
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the 
asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant" to prove utility.  
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, at 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).   
231 Brenner v. Manson 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (holding patent invalid for lack of 
utility, perhaps because no specific commercial use of the products produced by the 
claimed process, stating “a patent is not a hunting license”).  See CHISUM ET AL. supra 
note 6, at 707-727 (recognizing the inconsistency and discussing modern treatment).   
232 The prospect, rent-dissipation, commercialization, and registration theories 
would each see the granting of a hunting license to be entirely appropriate either as an 
effort to coordinate the hunt to avoid the risk of accidental shootings, to avoid racing, or 
because there are no investment-backed expectations to protect.   
233 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).   
234 For example, consider that during the prior case law when software was 
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new subject matters for which patents are being sought makes little sense.  
Among the many legal regimes that might possibly face a charge of not 
being designed to deal with new technologies, the patent system must have 
the best defense precisely because it is the one system expressly designed 
with such unforeseen technologies in mind.235  Indeed, technologies that 
are so foreseeable as to be obvious are not patentable in view of the 
system’s most basic patentability requirement: that the claimed invention 
not be in the prior art.  As a result, we should at a minimum avoid 
adopting the suggestion by some critics that we develop special rules to 
accommodate particular areas of patentable subject matter where 
protection is only recently being sought, such as biotechnology, computer 
software, and finance; and perhaps should be more clear in holding that 
the law is firmly settled on this issue by expressly stating that statutory 
subject matter raises no distinct hurdle to patentability.236   
                                                                                                                         
by drafting claims to a general purpose computer (a thing) programmed a certain way or 
a magnetically recordable medium (again a thing) on which a certain message had been 
recorded.  For a detailed discussion of the evolution in this area see CHISUM ET AL. supra 
note 6 at 728-828.      
235 The majority opinion of the sharply divided Supreme Court embraced this 
view in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980): 
This is especially true in the field of patent law. A rule that 
unanticipated inventions are without protection would conflict with the 
core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines 
patentability.     
236 As the Federal Circuit recognized in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 
851 (1999): 
The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory 
subject matter should not focus on which of the four categories of 
subject matter a claim is directed to process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter – but rather on the essential characteristics of the 
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility. Section 101 specifies 
that statutory subject matter must also satisfy the other “conditions and 
requirements” of Title 35, including novelty, nonobviousness, and 
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B. REFORMS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS  
An understanding of incentive for individual patentee’s to get 
patent scope “just right”237 provides some guidance on the ongoing battle 
over DOE, which allows a patentee to win an infringement suit against 
something that is not literally covered by the claims.238  Allowing the 
patentee recourse to this doctrine is bad in that it weakens the important 
self-disciplining effect described above; and eliminating the doctrine 
would be good in accentuating this incentive.239   
C. REFORMS FOR DEFERENCE TO THE PATENT OFFICE 
The patentees’ incentive to make their own correct determination 
of validity also raises serious issues for some of the present administrative 
law doctrines relating to the Patent Office.240  Because the Patent Office 
Regulations governing a patentee’s duty to disclose information material 
to validity provides no added incentive for the patentee to seek out such 
information,241 they may be unnecessary under either a hard-look or a soft-
look system.  Because the Patent Office is not the lower cost provider of 
information relating to validity, deference to its decisions on validity as 
being well informed is questionable on its facts.242  Moreover, to the 
extent decisions on validity can be made for so-called legal reasons that 
                                                 
237 See supra notes 209-219.   
238 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 
(1997) (discussing the doctrine of equivalents and its limits).   
239 Recent work by Wagner, makes a similar argument to justify cabining the 
reach of DOE.  See Wagner, supra note 52.  Under the registration theory’s focus on 
protecting investment-backed expectations with clear rules it is hard to see a justification 
for any scope of DOE at all.   
240 These include deference on questions of law and on issues of fact.  See supra 
note 70 (discussing Administrative Law aspects of the Patent System).   
241 See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that patentee has no duty to search).   
242 See, Orrin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2000) (criticizing arguments for deference to the Patent 
Office). See also, In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574-79 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reviewing 
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are based on facts, there is real potential for social costs relating to public 
choice and administrative problems in shaping those reasons and how they 
are applied.243   
The costs of a hard-look system are therefore made worse by the 
rule of deference.  As a result, many of the proposed shifts towards a hard 
look system should be avoided in part because they have a greater 
potential for public choice and administrative problems, especially under 
the present regime of heightened deference to the Patent Office.244   
D. REFORMS FOR POST ISSUANCE PROCEDURES  
Although the registration theory elucidates advantages of soft-look 
registration systems over hard look examination systems, a number of 
middle-ground approaches might also be considered.   These may offer the 
informational advantages of registration while trying to mitigate the high 
costs of full civil litigation through various post-issuance procedures to 
challenge an issued patent but conducted before the Patent Office.  
Approaches that have been tried include those called ex parte 
reexamination, inter partes reexamination, and inter partes opposition.245   
Although ex parte reexamination was introduced into the Patent 
System in 1980 to help address the concerns about the pernicious impact 
                                                 
243 Where the statute has provided the standards against which all claims are to 
be measured a shifting in the standards on a case-by-case basis will return us to the bleak 
result discussed supra note 224.   
244 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (Administrative Procedures Act 
requires deference to fact-finding by the Patent Office).  But compare, Merk & Co. v. 
Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Patent Office should 
not receive Chevron deference on legal questions because “Congress has not vested the 
Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power”) with, Dethmers Mfg. 
Co. v. Automatic Equipment Mfg. Co., 293 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir., 2001) 
(dissenting opinion of Judge Dyk questioning court’s decision to not give the Patent 
Office deference on the interpretation of its own regulations).   
245 For a discussion of these various procedures see CHISUM ET AL. supra note 6 





KIEFF  THE CASE FOR REGISTERING PATENTS  
 
of issued patent claims whose validity is questionable,246 it turns out to not 
work as a cost-effective means for removing such a claim because it only 
involves the same parties responsible for allowing the claim in the first 
instance:  the applicant and the Patent Office.247  In 1999, inter-partes 
reexamination was introduced to allow for more meaningful participation 
by third parties.248  However, in order to prevent patentee’s from having 
their patents held up in perpetual reexamination, this new procedure bars 
the third party from appealing the results of the reexamination,249 and 
estops the third party, including the real party in interest, from re-litigating 
                                                 
246 H.R. REP. 96-1307, pt. 1, 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 
6462-63 (“Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the validity 
of issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation.”).   
247 The ex parte nature of the process essentially means that a third-party’s 
involvement is limited to the initial request for reexamination.  Absent meaningful 
involvement this party is not able to effectively present to the decision-maker the very 
information relating to validity that the registration theory shows is most likely to be in 
the hands of some third party.  Whatever patent claims emerge from the reexamination 
will again be presumed valid.  Therefore, most third parties have rationally elected to 
hold any pertinent information relating to validity for later use at trial to undermine the 
presumption of validity that issued with the patent.  Indeed, ex parte reexamination has 
become a strategic tool for patentees to use as a way to effectively strengthen their 
presumption of validity against arguments they suspect may be raised by competitors in 
litigation.  If necessary, the patentee may narrow the claim during reexamination to avoid 
the newly discovered art, whereas during litigation the court must either hold the claim 
valid or invalid as written.  See 2001 Unted States Patent and Trademark Office 
Performance and Accountability Report, at 106 T.1, 119 T.13A-T.13B, (available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001/) (For the year 2001, 150 of the 296 
ex parte reexaminations were requested by third parties and only 1 was and inter partes 
reexamination).   
248  PL 106-113, ҝҝ 4601-4608, 113 Stat. 1501 (Nov. 29, 1999) (adding new 
sections, 35 U.S.C. § 311-18).  For an excellent review of the strategic concerns raised by 
this new procedure see Robert T. Pous and Charles L. Gholz, Will Inter Partes 
Reexamination be Embraced By Third Parties As An Alternative to Litigation?, 7 INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY, 37 (2000).   
249 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1); 35 U.S.C. § 134(c) (“A third party requester in an 
inter partes proceeding may appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
from the final decision of the administrative patent judge favorable to the patentability of 
any original or proposed amended or new claim of a patent, having once paid the fee for 
such appeal. The third party requester may not appeal the decision of the Board of Patent 
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anything that was or could have been decided during the reexamination.250  
As a result, third parties who are not yet sure they have the best argument 
may rationally elect to save it for use in later litigation rather than use it 
and loose it through the more sterile process of administrative 
adjudication, which does not allow for non documentary forms of 
evidence to be considered.251  Inter partes opposition proceedings are used 
in Europe and allow more types of evidence than the administrative 
procedures available for reexamination in the United States, but these 
must be filed within a short time after the patent has issued.252     
An alternative approach might be to include a special provision for 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to allow any one who has sufficient 
                                                 
250 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c): 
[Third party] is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil 
action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, United 
States Code, the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid 
and patentable on any ground which the third party requester raised or 
could have raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings. . . 
. [Estoppel] “does not prevent the assertion of invalidity based on 
newly discovered prior art unavailable to the third party requester and 
the Patent and Trademark Office at the time of the inter partes 
reexamination proceedings.”  
See also PL 106-113,ҝ 4607, 113 Stat. 1501 (Nov. 29, 1999):  
Any party who requests an inter partes reexamination under section 
311 of title 35, United States Code, is estopped from challenging at a 
later time, in any civil action, any fact determined during the process of 
such reexamination, except with respect to a fact determination later 
proved to be erroneous based on information unavailable at the time of 
the inter partes reexamination decision.  
251 Unlike litigation, reexamination does not allow for subpoenas, 
interrogatories, depositions, live testimony, and cross-examination.   
252 See European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, [hereinafter EPC] art. 99(1) 
(opposition must be filed “[w]ithin nine months from the publication of mention of the 
grant of the European Patent”) (available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/index.html) (last visited Dec. 10, 2002).  See also European Patent 
Office Guidelines for Examination: Part D Guidelines for Opposition Procedure, ch. I, 
p.1 (available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/index.htm) 
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interest but not necessarily reasonable apprehension of suit to bring an 
action in court challenging the validity of the patent.253  This would give 
access to better procedures and would not have the time restrictions of the 
opposition proceedings, but would then subject patentees to more potential 
challenges.254  In the final analysis, this approach begins to look most like 
the registration model, which in turn raises a number of litigation conduct 
issues that are discussed below.   
E. REFORMS FOR LITIGATION 
To be sure, the balancing effect on claim scope that draws the 
attention of most patent critics is imperfect, and must be further explored.  
These critics are correct that many issued patents are held invalid through 
federal court litigation.255  But the number of patents held invalid has 
decreased over time.256  Critics are also correct that while many issued 
patents may be invalid but also irrelevant to the market,257 some may be 
invalid and relevant in a bad way through their in terrorem effect without 
                                                 
253 See Thomas G. Pasternak and Karen J. Nelson, Declaratory Judgment 
Jurisdiction: A Dance on the Razor’s Edge, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 1043-49 
(reviewing the standard for obtaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases 
under present system).   
254 As elucidated by Lemley, one advantage in allowing more time to pass is that 
it allows more information about society’s interest in the patent to accrue, thereby 
decreasing the likelihood of error associated with ex ante efforts to predict which patents 
should receive close attention. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (citing Lemley, 
supra, note 6, at 1497).   
255 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity 
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-07 (1998) (reporting that about 46% of all 
patents litigated to a final judgment on validity issues are held invalid, including 
decisions on appeal and at summary judgment); Kimberly Moore, Judges, Juries and 
Patent Cases – Empirical Evidence to Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 
390 tbl.4 (2000) (reporting that 33% of patents are held invalid at trial).   
256 See Gloria K. Koenig, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-19 to 4-23 (rev. ed. 1980) (reporting invalidity numbers about 
25 years ago at 65%).  See also Allison & Lemley, supra note 255, at 206 n.53.   
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ever reaching litigation.258  This leaves alleged infringers to decide among 
several options: federal court litigation to get the patent adjudicated 
invalid; obtaining permission from the patentee; or not operating in a way 
that allegedly infringes.  The question raised by such patents is how best to 
decrease the social costs of allowing the alleged infringer to make and 
implement the socially optimal decision.   
According to the registration theory, these social costs may be 
decreased by use of tools in the proposed registration model that are 
slightly modified versions of two recent legal trends in the case law of the 
present system.259  These tools operate to decrease incentives for strategic 
                                                 
258 Not all potential defendants will elect to spend the money it took to withstand 
the preliminary injunction in the one-click shopping case discussed supra notes 1-4 and 
accompanying text.   
259 These tools come from the general debate over the so-called “American 
Rule” and the so-called “British Rule” of litigation.  As Abramowicz aptly explains, 
supra note 30, at 111, n. 464: 
Loser pays is often called the British rule, though variants of 
the British rule exist. On the economic choice among the various 
alternatives, see Richard D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic 
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 
(1989); John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner 
and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal 
Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An 
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule 
Discourage Low-Probability-of- Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 519 (1998); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal 
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); 
I.P.L. P’ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL 
J. ECON. 539 (1983); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A 
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of 
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Edward A. Snyder & James 
W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence 
Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990); Mark S. Stein, The 
English Rule with Client-to-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative 
Appraisal, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 603 (1995); and Bradley L. Smith, 
Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their 
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behavior and increase incentives for sharing information, thereby helping 
ensure that the alleged infringer is able to make and implement the 
socially optimal decision on the choice discussed above.260   
The first tool arises from an important innovation in Federal 
Circuit case law that can be used to decrease incentives for strategic 
behavior by patentees.  Despite to the critics’ view of the Federal Circuit 
as a court that is unduly pro-patentee, the Federal Circuit has led the 
charge in the area of Rule 11 sanctions in cases such as Judin where a 
discretionary ruling of no sanctions was vacated with instructions to award 
appropriate sanctions against a patentee, and its trial and appellate 
counsel.261  Such disciplining of errant patentees also may be achieved 
with other similar legal devices including 28 USC § 1927 (counsel’s 
liability for vexatious litigation), and 35 USC § 285 (attorney fees for 
exceptional cases).  Importantly, Judin involved the patentee’s failure to 
conduct a pre-filing investigation on infringement.  Under a system like 
the proposed registration model, such a disciplining device might also be 
extended to curb patentees’ failure to conduct pre-filing investigations on 
validity.  
The second tool arises from a highly evolved body of law in the 
patent area that can operate to punish clients and their lawyers for reliance 
on unsatisfactory opinions of counsel.262  The standards for opinions of 
counsel used by alleged infringers to insulate them from liability could be 
applied to potential plaintiff patentees before they are allowed to bring an 
action claiming liability.  This would improve a system like the proposed 
registration model by spreading the costs of validity determinations among 
                                                 
260 Neither of these tools was present during the brief window in our history 
during which a true registration system was in use.  The registration system lasted for 43 
years from 1793 to 1836.  Indeed, it was not until the 1870 Act that emphasis was placed 
on the claim.  See CHISUM ET AL. supra, note 6, at 19-21.   
261 See Judin v. U.S. 110 F.3d 780 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing for abuse of 
discretion a judgment of no sanctions under Rule 11 against patentee and its counsel).     
262 See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 978 F.Supp. 184 (D. Del. 
1997) aff’d 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (chastising authoring counsel by name while 
affirming award of treble damages for willful infringement because opinion of counsel 
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patentees and alleged infringers.  The cost shifting effects discussed above 
will provide incentives for patentees and likely infringers to exchange 
information about the strength of their respective cases, thereby somewhat 
mitigating the risk of duplicative expenditures.  This effect is enhanced by 
the patentee’s interest in communicating with alleged infringers so as to 
make the alleged infringement appear willful and thereby win treble 
damages.263  Therefore, according to the registration theory, we should 
move to a soft look system like the registration model accompanied by 
fee-shifting reforms to cabin the very pernicious effects explored by 
advocates of hard look approaches.    
VI. CONCLUSION 
Patent law can operate to minimize social costs, including those 
typically associated with information, administration, public choice, races 
for a common prize, and bargaining.  The case for an alternative model 
registration system helps reveal for the first time a normative theory of the 
law and economics of the positive law patent-obtaining rules called the 
registration theory.  The case for an alternative model registration system 
also is helpful in showing why increased scrutiny of patent applications 
would worsen, not improve, the present system’s performance.   
Some may argue that a full blown shift to registration may not be 
optimal because the formality of Patent Office examination may have a 
positive effect in screening out some truly non-serious filings.  But it is not 
clear that the costs of litigating under the proposed registration model 
would not serve the same screening function.  The present patent system 
has already evolved some powerful disciplining tools that restrict patents’ 
ability to cause many of the social costs that prompted the critics.  To the 
extent this effect should be increased, it may be beneficial to dial back 
somewhat the presumption of validity and increase the patentee’s burdens 
of conducting pre-filing investigations on both infringement and validity 
before bringing suit to enforce a patent.   
                                                 
263 See Pasternak and Nelson, supra note 253 (showing how such 
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Finally, even if the decision is made to ignore the prescriptive 
aspects of this paper, the new normative registration theory for the patent-
obtaining rules offered herein turns out to have more explanatory power 
than the prospect and rent-dissipation theories in the literature and thereby 
contributes to the literature by both elucidating how and why these rules 
operate and by serving as a new lens through which subsequent reforms 
can be judged.   
* * * * * 
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